Monitoring Report on local government reforms in Modova by -
1Monitoring
Report
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIAL INITIATIVES (IDIS) VIITORUL
Analiza celor mai recente tendinþe
ale democraþiei locale ”i regionale
în Republica Moldova
 on Local Government Reforms
in Moldova
March 2003 - January 2004
2I. OVERVIEW: RECENT TRENDS IN LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
1.1. The Impact of Centralization Policies on Local Government in 2003 ..................... 3
1.2. European Integration and Implementation of the PACE Resolutions ..................... 5
1.3. Federalization and its Consequences on Local Public Administration ................... 6
II. LOCAL AUTONOMY AND THE PROCESS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN MOLDOVA
2.1. The Impact of New Laws on Local Public Administration ........................................ 13
2.2. The May 2003 Local elections .................................................................................. 16
2.3. The State of Financial Autonomy .............................................................................. 17
2.4. The State of Municipal Ownership ............................................................................ 18
2.5. The Statute of Locally Elected Officials and the Internal
        Organization of Local Government ......................................................................... 20
2.6. Administrative Control and Legal Guarantees
       Against the Abuse of Local Government ................................................................. 23
2.7. The Right of Association of Local Government ........................................................ 25
III.  STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM
3.1. Monitoring the implementation process of the
        CLRAE Recommendations in Moldova ................................................................... 29
3.2. Final Recommendations ........................................................................................... 30
General Overview
of the statute of local autonomy in the Republic of Moldova
With the supoort provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
through the Eurasia Foundation. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not neces-
sarly those of the Foundation and the United States Agency for International Development.
A Report by:
Dr. hab.Victor Popa
Dr. Igor Munteanu
Copyright: IDIS Viitorul, Chi”inªu, Iacob Hîncu 10/14, Republic of Moldova
For more information or comments please do not hesitate to contact us at:
Tel: (00 373-22) 21 09 32, idis_viitorul@mdl.net
Chisinau , Iacob Hincu 10/14, Republic of Moldova
Phone and Fax: (373-22) 21 09 32
e-mail: idis_viitorul@mdl.net
Summary:
3Reviewing the main events that took place
in 2003 the impact of various processes and
tendencies in local public administration (LPA)
should be noted. These processes and tenden-
cies regarding the public power system in Mol-
dova are apparently contradictory. In this con-
text the strong influence of the state adminis-
tration in strengthening the vertical power base
should be mentioned. This principle, although
it is mitigated in external communication  as
a consequence of the numerous interventions
and appeals elaborated on the subject of lo-
cal administration by the experts of the Euro-
pean Council, - continues to guide the process
of state decision making. Decisions affected by
this policy include: resource distribution, admi-
nistrative auditing and other state policies in
areas of public interest such as: price auditing,
tax auditing and economic development.
Understanding LPA in Moldova is not possible
without taking into account two major issues: Eu-
ropean integration and the settlement of the Trans-
nistrian conflict. Both tendencies have the same
strategic objective, the settlement of the territorial
conflicts and the strengthening of the state. This is
to be achieved through the establishment of a
more favorable economical and political situation
in the Republic of Moldova, as part of the consti-
tutional, political and economical arrangements.
Achieving these complementary targets however
has not been clearly defined by the state officials.
Even the process of federalization started by the
authorities in February 2003 involves great risks for
the democratic institutions in the Republic of Mol-
dova. The European Parliament has also noted the
danger of this process stating in its resolution of
December 18th 20031 (p.6) that:  the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Republic of Moldova is
the basis for any peaceful settlement of the con-
flict. Furthermore the EP appreciates that  the
peace plan presented by Russia with the purpose
of offering legitimacy for the present situation con-
stitutes an obstacle on the path of continuous de-
mocratic development and does not contribute
to the stabilization of the region.
The process of federalization could have sub-
stantial consequences not just on the federal
format of the central power, but also on the
degree of local and regional autonomy and on
the competencies of the local and regional
authorities elected on May 25 th, 2003. This has
made us include a brief analysis of the tenden-
cies in this domain as part of this report.
I. OVERVIEW: RECENT TRENDS
IN LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
1.1. The Impact of Centralization
policies on Local Government in 2003
Directly after the general elections in Februa-
ry 2001, the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM)
formulated the principle of the vertical power .
This principle has played a major ideological
role in the party in its strategy to strengthen its
control on the territorial-administrative structu-
res. To achieve this, supporters of the CPM were
appointed in state bodies, while at the same
time disloyal elements were cleaned from the
state structures. Disloyal elements were remo-
ved under the guise of the fight against cor-
ruption, hiring better qualified professionals but
also through insistent rejecting of unwanted
candidates. This happened to mayoralty secre-
taries, department chiefs and even to catego-
ries of auxiliary office workers for finance and
budget, public administration and education.
For example: of the rayon chiefs for child pro-
tection only one out of 11 was confirmed. But,
the strengthening of the sectors role as early as
2001-2002, and depriving the rayons of impor-
tant financial-budgetary attributes in August
2001, did not only have the goal to get rid of
disloyal elements in the territory, but also to
ensure the unconditional implementation of
economical and political decisions. The main
principle in the relation between the central
power and the local authorities is the installment
of a net of hierarchical superiors in all the
domains which the government considers are
of national interest . Indifferent of adopted le-
gislation or whether the necessary resources for
the implementation of the assigned tasks are
available at the local level.
As an example can serve the regular appeals
of the government to raise the efficiency of tax
collection, parallel with the reduction of the
number of tax collectors for local authorities,
through decisions which stipulate the size of the
staff. This is against the stipulations of the 6 th
article of the European Charter (the sequence
of structures and the administrative means for
the tasks of the local administration). Chi”inªu
for example had to reduce its staff by 45,4%,
or in absolute terms: from 1,140 to 441 emplo-
yees, and remained with only 0,8 civil servants
for 1.000 inhabitants (while the EU the average
is 36 employees for 1,000 inhabitants).
4It is believed sometimes that the imperfect
legislation is due to the short legislative experi-
ence. Unfortunately, in the Republic of Moldo-
va bad laws often are adopted deliberately,
with the purpose of bringing about confusion,
as well as the lack of progress in the political
and administrative decentralization between
the central government and the local authori-
ties, including public finances. However, since
all domains are to be considered vulnerable
in conditions of an acute deficit of public re-
sources, the local authorities are exposed to a
systematic attack, achieved through frequent
interventions of the state. Other methods are
through daily auditing of the administrated bud-
gets, as well as allotting tasks without specify-
ing the financial sources. We could even say
that there is a real economy of the administra-
tive system, through which different auditing
aspects are kept over the legally recognized
duties so that the local authorities are made
responsible for the effects or the absence of
the policies at the national level.
An important instrument to achieve this, is the
instrument of administrative repression. This in-
strument is used against local authorities, which
have been warned to unconditionally and im-
mediately fulfill all the central indications, if a
simple warning does not help (for example: the
government s decision through which the pe-
nalties are raised for not paying on time the
wages of the budgetary categories)2. Another
instrument used by the authors of the vertical
power belongs to the exertion of influence, le-
gally unjustified, in domains where administra-
tive control is applied, exerted in Moldova by
the government state territorial offices 3. Through
this the administrative control that should be
exerted by the authorities of the central admi-
nistration exclusively on the tasks delegated to
the local public authorities (art 8, p.2, Euro-
pean Charter) have a compulsory character on
all domains recognized by the local authority s
competence. The territorial offices (Chapter II,
p.7 from the rules) are skilled to: exert compul-
sory control over decisions of the local authori-
ties of Ist and IInd level, on the  documents le-
gality regarding the organization of auctions,
documents of assigned grounds, of normative
documents signed by the mayor, the rayons
president, the documents of employing and the
documents of firing the personnel of LPA, the
orders of the expenses or the financial pledges
of at least 30,000 lei for the Ist level and at least
300,000 for the IInd level but also the legality of
the documents emitted  for the exertion of the
duties assigned by the state to the authorities
of local public administration. This opportunity
control is applied in an unsuitable way to all
actions undertaken by the local authorities and
not just to the delegated ones! This is against
the recognized functions at the European level
for the authorities for which are recognized this
type of competences.
The third instrument of exerting vertical po-
wer is the financial one. The practice of sen-
ding from above the control numbers for the
formal aprovement of the local budgets did not
avoid in 2003 the local authorities which unlike
previous years kept the appearances of a cer-
tain legal coherence. The Parliament in Septem-
ber  October 2003 already adopted the an-
nual budget for 2004, when 95% of all local
authorities had not even reached the variant
of budget projects for December. As a result
they were forced by the superior hierarchical
authorities (obviously  by the rayon and the
state territorial offices) to quickly adopt the al-
lotted quota by the Ministry of Finance and its
rayon departments.
Finally, we mention the manner of speech
that central officials use, (for pleasure or politi-
cal interest) terms that are not correct from a
legal point of view, but which, through syste-
matic use, produce a behavior which is a part
of the administrative system of the authorities.
An example comes from the newspaper Mol-
dova Suveranª, calling the field visits of offi-
cials: meetings with the staff of territorial ad-
ministrative units4 , establishing commands
and giving indications to the local authorities.
The same as last year, President Vladimir Voro-
nin insists on the necessities to re-establish the
vertical power , which he stated in his territorial
meetings and in his statements in the press.
According to Voronin the reform of 1998 ended
with the creation of 12 small governments, real
feudal knezats, which could not assure social-
economic prosperity of the inhabitants, re-
ducing the local governments to the statute
decorative institutions, without real opportuni-
ties for territorial development5(3)  The lack of
economic resources for territorial development
has resulted in over 64% of the people living
under the poverty line, mostly inhabitants from
rural zones, especially from small towns. Howe-
ver, the officials could not present until now real
arguments to support their assertions that the
disintegration of the old judets (11) in the struc-
ture of the new rayons (33) will increase the lo-
cal resources, be reduce bureaucratic local
administration and strengthen legitimacy.
The official newspapers vehemently attacked
the analysis of the reform costs, made by IDIS
and BCI in January-February 2003; however this
did not serve as a plausible argument on redu-
cing the costs of the future territorial-adminis-
trative structures. More than that, the costs sub-
stantially grew for the maintenance of the ray-
on structures. According to the government s
decisions No.688 and No.1220 from 10.06.2003
and 10.10.2003, the personnel of village may-
oralties has to be between 4 and 13,5 units; and
the city mayoralties (except Chi”inªu and Bªlþi),
between 8 and 26,5 units. The personnel of the
rayons president and his seven sub-divisions will
be allowed to be between 60,5 to 83 units. The-
se numbers show certain growth of the number
of civil servants, although, as we have seen, it
5is insufficient for them to work normally. Aware
of these tendencies, the officials repeatedly
required the rayons leadership to respect the
structure adopted through the government de-
cision of the leadership staff of the territorial
units. The Parliament voted in September 2003
for new amendments on the Code of adminis-
trative trespasses, approved on the 9 th of July
by the cabinet ministers, and according to
them, there fines are foreseen from 70 to 100
minimal wages for the budgetary central and
local institutions which will exceed the quota
rules of personnel. Nobody knows if these pe-
nalties were applied to the rayon councils most
of which, continued to hire new office workers
for the structures which were created after June
2003. Probably not, they ensured the necessa-
r y protection (against the penalties) through
various personal relationships, or through servi-
ces fulfilled at the indications given by the go-
vernment on the domains, which obviously re-
gard only the local public authorities. We can
only guess to what extent this spectacular per-
sonnel increase was reflected in the budget. We
mention that in September, government offi-
cials declared that they intend to require the
Parliament to earmark 140 mln lei for finalizing
the change to the new rayon system. After this
finalization immediately after the elections, they
received another 180 mln for the expenses
planned as early as 2002 through the local
budgets and the central subsidies. Thus, in con-
cordance with the government s decisions of
2001, 2002, and in 2003 the governmental
press closed the access of civil society to dis-
cussions in public of these evolutions, despite
of their request to start a dialogue6. The invita-
tion from IDIS Viitorul to debate together with
the employees from the Public Administrative
Department of the State Office, the property
statute, the statute of the local councilor and
the administrative auditing, exerted through the
territorial offices, remained without an answer,
although the respective letters were posted in
September and October.
The process of returning to rayons seems to
serve another purpose, which we have to take
into account. Thus, besides the acrimonious
satisfaction of the CPM leaders to cancel the
results of the reform initiated by the previous
governments (1998) under the argument of ful-
filling their electoral promises, we can notice
that the government wanted to decrease the
role of the conventional regional authorities
towards the autonomous-territorial authorities
(UTAG). On July 28 th 2003, The Parliament ad-
opted in the second reading, the definitive
modifications of art.73, 110, and, 111 from the
Constitution, through which were established
the constitutional stipulations of the special ju-
ridical status of the territorial autonomy Gagauz
Yeri. According to these modifications, Gªgªu-
zia is an autonomous territorial formation with
a special juridical status, an integral part of
Republic of Moldova, which independently sol-
ves the political, economical and cultural pro-
blems according to the stipulations of the Con-
stitution.
71 deputies of the PCM faction and 5 inde-
pendent deputies voted in favor of the modifi-
cations. But, not later than August, a group of
deputies (18 from 29) of the Popular Assembly
of Comrat signed a petition through which they
required that the Gagauz autonomy should
have the status of a subject with the same rights
as Transnistria, as part of the future federation,
requiring that UTAG be represented at the ne-
gotiations regarding the federalization  7(4).Pre-
viously, President Vladimir Voronin, publicly ex-
cluded this possibility, mentioning that the fe-
deralization principle cannot be extended en-
dlessly. However already in September, the chief
of state declared that he greeted and encou-
raged the endeavors of the UTAG to participa-
te as a subject of the future federation, and that
because he could discern the possibil ity of
using the recognized state UTAG as a negotion
model in relationship with Tiraspol. With all this,
the leaders from Comrat were never invited to
participate as the pentagonal part of the ne-
gotiators, nor did the Russian Federation con-
sult them on the model proposed in the middle
of November 2003.
1.2. European Integration
and implementation of the PACE
Resolutions:
There is an obvious relation between the im-
plementation of the international pledges and
the steps made by the officials from Chi”inªu
with the goal to integrate and associate to EU.
It is obviously in the interest of the Republic of
Moldova to eliminate any suspicions over its will
and capacities to honor the member s obliga-
tions of the European Council. Without which,
we can not talk about assuming more complex
pledges such as opening the negotiations for
the country s association to EU. That is why it is
so incomprehensible how the authorities of RM
imagine they can be heard by the EU in condi-
tions when there are serious questions over the
way the authorities fulfilled PACE recommenda-
tions regarding the normalization of the politi-
cal process and the democratic institutions, No.
1280 from April the 24 th and also the recom-
mendation Nr. 110 of CPLRE over the local and
regional democracy in Moldova8, as a result
of monitoring the reform process in the local
public administration.
The opinions expressed by the opposition are
negative regarding the way the political power
tries to fulfill the European political forum re-
commendations, showing its capacities to as-
similate the necessary standards for the wor-
king of democratic institutions in the RM. As a
result of the political crisis since the middle of
November, when the chief of the state, Vladi-
6mir Voronin, intended to sign the Memorandum
of the Transnistrian conflict settlement, a Com-
mittee for the Protection of Independence and
the Constitution was created. Many political
part ies and NGOs joined this organization.
Among the proposals of this informal political
organism were: the defense of the existing con-
stitutional frame of the Republic of Moldova,
attracting attention in European forums regar-
ding the situation in Moldova, rejecting the at-
tempts of harming the peoples sovereignty,
ensuring the achievement of the political plu-
ralism in RM and promoting political dialogue
in society on the strategic development priori-
ties. After the foundation, the political opposi-
tion sent out numerous appeals and declara-
tions in which it underlined its concern regar-
ding the lack of progress in the targeted do-
mains of the Resolutions from April and Septem-
ber 20029. While the officials from Chi”inªu ap-
preciate as a successful experience the moni-
toring and the fulfillment of these recommen-
dations, the opposition vehemently disputes
these assertions, stating that political evolutions
from 2003 are disastrous for the democratic
institutions and the countr y s image. More than
that, the CPIC members find that, in 2002, a
degradation took place of the general-politi-
cal situation simultaneously with a stronger in-
tervention of the state power structures, justice,
the security service and the police in supervi-
sing and intimidating the united opposition. The
democratic institutions do not function any
more in conditions when clear signs of total
usurpation of the state power by the country s
president exist. Respectively, CPIC required from
its representative in Chi”inªu , Vladimir Philli-
pov, the immediately convocation of the mo-
nitoring Committee for fulfilling, by the Repu-
blic of Moldova, of the member obligations of
the statute of the European Council and sen-
ding two reporters for supervising the situation.
We mention that, on October the 1st 2003,
president Voronin participated in the fall wor-
king session of the European Council, when the
mandate owned by RM as  President of the Eu-
ropean Council s Minister Committee ended.
On this occasion, the chief of state declared
that the RM totally fulfilled the pledges of pre-
adherence towards the European Council and
the PACE resolutions. Literally, he asserted that,
Although initially, the two PACE resolutions were
perceived very hard both by the opposition and
the authorities, Moldova unconditionally fulfil-
led the majority of the recommendations. In
doing so they not only achieved political stabi-
lity, but also progress in the introduction of Eu-
ropean Standards in the political process in
Moldova10(5). The representatives from the Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs announced that in Au-
gust RM would sign agreements of free exchan-
ge with all the member countries of the Stabili-
ty Pact of South-East Europe by the end of 2003.
Concomitantly, after Moldova will deposit the
adherence application to EU, in September
2003, the government was supposed to elabo-
rate a concept of European integration. We
ought to remember that the idea of European
integration for the RM is an idea formulated sin-
ce 2002, and elaborated a national strategy
for EU integration. This change shows not only
the suitability of a more clear vocabulary, but
also the recognition of some limits of Chi”inªu
s diplomacy, which promised that RM will join
the EU in 200711.
1.3. Federalization and its impact
on Local Public Administration:
Launched on the 12 th of February 2002 by
President Voronin, the idea of federalization did
not have much success among citizens. The
project had been adopted by the OSCE Missi-
on, which supported in the summer of 2002, in
Kiev, a territorial reunification project of RM
through federal ization12. For 37,80% of the
respondents of the Public Opinion Barometer
the transformation of the Republic of Moldova
in a federal state is unacceptable, 25,5% had
no answer, and 13,10% answered: none of my
business13. Comparing the data of the IPP Opi-
nion Barometer with the IDIS Opinion Poll in the
beginning of 2002 we have to mention the gro-
wing tendency of acceptance of the federali-
zation project in Moldova. The firmest oppo-
nents to federalization were ethnic Moldovans
(58%), men (54,3%) and people with higher
education (68%). Ethnic Russians are more fa-
vorable to federalization, especially those from
urban areas. Among Ukrainians we find the hi-
ghest values of no comment (30%). As a rule,
the perceived risks of a possible federalization
of Moldova are connected with: the state dis-
solution (38,6%), worsening of interethnic rela-
tions (18,8%) and the transformation of Moldo-
va in a Russian protectorate (12,8%).
According to the Kiev document, Moldova
will be divided into federal territorial formations
which will have their own constitution and le-
gislation, and will have the same rights as the
federal bodies. Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE
are to be the guarantors of respecting the sti-
pulations in the agreement; any other divergen-
ces will be solved through negotiations and di-
rect consultations between RM and Transnistria,
through the mediation of the guarantor states
and OSCE. With certain hesitations, President
Voronin finally supported this project, and as-
serted that federalization seems to be the only
solution which can lead to the territorial reunifi-
cation of the country. Yet, the chief of state
mentioned that this project has to stress the
asymmetrical character of the relation betwe-
en the federal state and the federal subjects.
He made it clear that he is not pleased by the
principle of equality of rights applied for both
subjects by the authors of this project. Although
the government is in favor of federalization the-
7re is a lot of resistance from the political oppo-
sition, most of civil society and many NGOs in
Moldova, because this would not solve, but on
the contrary, worsen the definitive settlement
process of the conflict.
More specifically, the project can not be
accepted for the following reasons. (1) The pro-
posal actually disputes Moldovas legitimacy,
but not of the rebel region, and any statute
modification has to be based on the citizens
agreement and not as a result of a foreign po-
wer s wish. (2) The project means the loss of RMs
independence as a sovereign and indepen-
dent state. (3) The project was not discussed
before hand either with the Parliament and
political parties in RM, or with civil society and
the Constitutional Court. (4) The project appeals
to a federal democratic principle, without ta-
king into account the presence of foreign tro-
ops on the separatist territory of RM, the pre-
sence of Russian citizens in Tiraspol s gover-
nment who are encouraged to negotiate as if
they had an international legitimacy, as a re-
sult of a foreign intervention. (5) The project
excludes any possibility of a subsequent asso-
ciation to the EU for RM in the account of some
illusory benefits as a result of the territorial reu-
nification detached as a result of the rebellion
from 1992. (6) The project begins from the fal-
se premise that the adoption of the new con-
stitution could solve the dispute, while this can
only legitimate the dictatorship of Smirnov, who
from an offender (author of power usurpation
in the region) will be transformed in a founder
of a new state. (7) The project does not remove
the public fear that, as a result of this federali-
zation, RM will be transformed in a Russian pro-
tectorate, the constitutional authorities will have
equal rights with the separatist government.
The document launched in the summer of
2002, did not pass unobserved by western sta-
tes, which left it over to the officials from Chi”i-
nªu to accept or reject the proposal. A study
launched by the International Crisis Group sus-
tained that the OSCE cannot be named the
author of this project, because the mission only
participated at the announcement. The text had
been written by Russia and the Ukraine and re-
mained to be a working document. Having
been written by Russia explains why many arti-
cles of the proposal are integral copies of sti-
pulations of the Russian Constitution 15(6). Also,
the political settlement of the conflict can not
happen without the full involvement of the EU16,
which could bring RM closer to democratic set-
tlement standards and would solve the situa-
tion in which the mediator states actually de-
fend the interests of a single subject: the se-
cessionist region. Quoting Javier Solana, the
author mentioned certain recent evolutions,
which confirm the transformation process of the
EU in a security structure, which will assume new
responsibilities connected with the administra-
tion of security crises. The EU presence in set-
tlement mechanisms would assure higher poli-
tical pressure towards the mediators and would
limit their capacities to make declarations, and
then do the opposite. The public opinion on the
position taken by the officials from Chi”inªu
and Tiraspol towards the federalization project
of RM remained uncertain for a couple of
months. On one hand, the Moldovan authori-
ties anticipated the publishing of the OSCE pro-
ject, launching in the state media the idea of
modifying the RMs Constitution with the purpo-
se to organize a Two Chamber Parliament which
should contribute to a suitable representation
of the territory, including settling in this way the
Transnistrian conflict. An involvement of the EU
should follow the next steps: setting up joint
moldo-ukrainian custom points with the EU par-
ticipation on the Transnistrian segment of the
frontier, a juridical examination and political
involvement and mediation in the process of
elaborating the new constitution. The EU is im-
portant due to the important political and eco-
nomical-financial levers to influence both the
separatist government and the mediator sta-
tes and it can guarantee the mechanisms of
post-conflict guarantees.
On the other hand, after publishing the OSCE
project the RM leadership avoided expressing
its point of view, leaving this to the political
opposition, which the governmental press criti-
cized aggressively for rejecting the project. Also
the attitude of the Transnistrian authorities be-
came clear later. The fact that the agreement
was supposed to have priority over the Consti-
tution of RM, determined some of the leaders
from Tiraspol to qualify the document as an in-
ternational treaty that was supposed to be sig-
ned by the two sides in the conflict. It is sure
that after the chief of diplomacy from Tiraspol
expressed his positive attitude towards the OSCE
project he fell in disgrace of the Transnistrian
leader Igor Smirnov. Just before the OSCE sum-
mit in Porto, December 2002, the Moldovan and
Transnistrian authorities had to officially express
their attitude towards the OSCE project. It be-
came clear, that, on the whole, neither the
Moldovan nor the Transnistrian authorities total-
ly accepted the stipulations of the project pro-
posed by Kiev, except the agreement on the
principle to solve the Transnist r ian confl ict
through federalization. On February 14 th 2003,
President Vladimir Voronin published an agree-
ment project which was to be signed by RM,
Transnistria, OSCE and the guarantee countries.
The document stipulated: the formation of a
joint moldo-transnistrian constitutional commis-
sion which had to elaborate a new Constitution
on the basis of the federalist principle propo-
sed in the OSCE project; the organization of a
referendum for adopting the new Constitution
and the organization of elections on the whole
territory of the country in the new constitutional
structures before February the 25th 2005.
President Voronin scheduled the main stages,
estimating that a month would be needed for
the formation of the joint commission, about 6
8months for the elaboration a new constitution,
and about 2-3 months for the international exa-
mination and public debates on the constitu-
tion as well as a few months for organizing the
referendum on both banks of the Dniester. In
this timeframe the new constitution would be
adopted before February the 1st 2004. In his turn,
Igor Smirnov launched on February the 28th 2003
his own agreement project which proposed,
theoretically, a series of similar concepts with
those contained in President Voronins project,
including the terms of general elections, the
future federal structures, but with a single es-
sential difference  it did not invoke at all that
the agreement had as a basis the principles
from the OSCE project of July the 3rd 2002. From
the OSCE project only the notion of a federal
state was used. This showed again the fact that
the Transnistrian leaders rejected the stipulations
of the project launched by OSCE and will insist
on the variant of contractual federation, which
is in fact a confederative one.
Numerous cultural celebrities, public figures,
and politicians declared themselves vehement-
ly against the federalization project imposed on
Republic of Moldova by foreign powers. The Pre-
sident of the Constitutional Court, Victor Pu”ca”,
declared that the present Constitution is good
enough for bringing in other stipulations regar-
ding the territorial autonomy. Appeals of inter-
national experts show that the current Consti-
tution17does not have to be changed,  specify-
ing that, in legal terms a mechanism of can-
celing the current constitution does not exist,
even through the adoption of a new Constitu-
tion. This makes it clear that the whole initiative
centered on a new constitution runs counter to
the current constitution. Obviously, the sides of
the conflict did not ignore the active discussi-
ons in the international press and in Moldovan
society. The Ministr y of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation strongly reacted specifying
that EU implication would complicate the exis-
tent process of negotiations and that, any ot-
her changes of the present format should be
made in a consensual way, that is with the agre-
ement of each side. This is an unacceptable
condition, as neither Russia nor Tiraspol would
ever accept the widening of the pentagonal
format after they assured in 2000, through the
official inclusion of Transnistria in the group of
negotiating parties, a faultless tandem with in-
vincible results in any situation. The same de-
claration mentioned that international peace-
keeping forces were unwanted because Rus-
sian peacekeeping troops assured the cease-
fire from July 1992 till now in a stable way, any
change of this format could attract unwanted
consequences. Few could imagine that in a si-
tuation in which public opinion does not seem
to be favorable to changing the state structu-
re, the authorities still continue to promote the
federal solution. In the middle of November
2003, the opposition comments on a new do-
cument launched by the Russian Federation,
entitled the Kozak Memorandum. In this memo-
randum Russia had already negotiated with
both sides, Moldova and Transnistria, who had
already agreed to sign with the definite purpo-
se of establishing a mechanism to delegate the
competences in the frame of an asymmetric
federation. More than that, the second day,
according to the Russian official, Dmitrii Kozak,
the Memorandum was to be signed in the pre-
sence Vladimir Putin, who was to arrive imme-
diately in Chi”inªu.
The Declaration brought about a real shock
in the public opinion in Moldova and for the
Western states, because in spite of the decla-
rations of the Russian official, neither the OSCE,
nor the European Council had been consulted
beforehand over the text negotiated by Russia.
However the signing of this Memorandum would
have changed essentially the tone and the
agenda of the debates of the OSCE Summit in
Maastricht, on December the 2nd 2003. The first
reaction of the opposition was to ask the chief
of state for explanations on the origins of this
secretly negotiated document, demanding
Voronin to reject it. Not receiving the expected
answer, all the political parties except the CPM
launched street protests, culminating with bur-
ning the flag of the Russian Federation, the
government s resignation and the convocation
of the anticipated elections. Hundreds of pro-
tests, declarations and appeals came to the
address of the Parliament and the international
forums. This showed an extremely active mobi-
lization of civil society against the solution pro-
posed by Russia 18.
The text of the Memorandum and the com-
ments launched by D.Kozak in Chi”inªu and Ti-
raspol, were, secretive over the way in which
the Russian officials see this process and, in their
turn, insist that, the memorandum also had the
mission to solve the acute problem of Russias
international image, before the Maastricht
Summit. On the other hand, the document han-
ded recently to President Voronin can not ca-
mouflage the feeling that it is written, under the
dictation of the separatist leaders and has the
role to press the authorities from Chi”inªu to
accept elements that do not go well even
among the most doctrinaire parts of the CPM.
The Memorandum contains the renunciation of
the principle of equality of the federal parts
and the contractual federation(promoted
flamboyantly by the leaders from Tiraspol). It
used the expression asymmetric federation,
recently proposed by Voronin, but proposed a
model which does not seem either viable or
productive for future elections. In the document
the Russian model establishes only Transnistria
and Gªgªuzia as subjects of the future federa-
tion, the rest of the territory is named a federal
territory , without an autonomous legal status,
and under the influence of the two subjects of
the federation. Apparently, the Russian Fede-
ration seems to renounce its obligation as lead
actor of the peacekeeping operations in the
9secessionist region, but this is actually becau-
se it follows the demilitarization of the whole
countr y. Situated between a rock (Moscows
pressure) and a hard place (the protests from
the opposition but also from the West), presi-
dent Voronin announced at the end of Novem-
ber that he would not sign the Memorandum
and immediately after which followed allergic
reactions from Moscow and Transnistria. As a
result of not signing the Memorandum, the offi-
cials from Tiraspol announced that they will tou-
ghen their position at the negotiations19  and
stated it would resort to economic penalties
asserting that, in this way, the officials from Chi-
”inªu lost their historic chance to reunite the
countr y . A brief analysis of the memorandum
is needed to establish if this historic chance
actually existed.
The Memorandum actually legalizes the con-
servation of the Transnistrian war elites in the
Transnistrian government. This happens through:
(a) The confirmation of the executive power s
legitimacy in Transnistria (art.14.6), (b) the for-
mation of structural powers in the region exclu-
sively on the federal laws (until the adoption
of these laws, the executive power in Transnis-
tria exerts power, according to the existent le-
gislation); (c) keeping the integrity of the cur-
rent electoral system of Transnistria and the
standards which settle these activities; (d) im-
posing a long unjust i f ied t ransi t ion per iod
(art.14.11, 14.12, 14.13) until 2015; (e) the ab-
sence of recognition of the way through which
the electoral procedures operate through which
the current Smirnov government rules the re-
gion.
More than that, articles 3.13 and 3.14 expli-
citly contain the right to secession of the RMN.
Even though the motives for exerting this right
are not explained, neither are the procedures
and conditions for adopting this decision by the
subjects of the federation. The Memorandum
does not make any difference in the relation
between the secession procedure and the aut-
hority of the federal centre, nor does it define
a hierarchic relation between the federal cen-
tre and its subjects. In spite of the stipulations
of article 3.3., where it is said incidentally that
the federations constitution, the laws and the
normative documents adopted by the federal
authorities, have an application power and are
compulsory on the entire territory of the fede-
ral state, the project does not contain any ot-
her stipulation which can enforce this hierarchi-
cal character of the federal legislative  nor-
mative settlements over the actions of the sub-
jects. There does not even exist a phrase, which
gives priority to the federal Constitution in rela-
tion with other sub-national constitutions. These
are totally neglected in the mediation proce-
dures in case conflicts appear between the
federal center and its sub national subjects, also
there are no mechanisms stipulated of federal
constitutional auditing over the power structu-
res of the federal subjects. The necessity of the
existence of an institution of the federal gover-
nment at the level of the federal subjects is
even neglected! At the same time, the possibi-
lities of the legal organs of the federal subjects
in solving the general-federative problems, in
relation with the attributions delegated to the
federal centre are exceptionally high (art.7b
and 7e), stipulating several domains in which,
the juridical settlement of the federations at-
tributions are defined through some laws of
its constitutive subjects and, more than that,
even through delegation of some federal com-
petences to its subjects, for this purpose sup-
plementary financial resources should be allot-
ted from the federal budget.
The description of this model follows a rever-
se logic. The subjects of the constitution are
stronger than the federal state. The law that the
subjects can make actually represents the ske-
leton of the state structure. This model is inde-
ed asymmetric, but its asymmetry is of a cen-
trifugal nature, causing doubts over the viabili-
ty of this kind of political system, constructed
on scattered institutional entities, marked by
conflicts still going on after the conflict of the
1991-1992, and which can not be solved
through traditional federal models. The trials to
settle several organic competences of the fe-
deral centre (art.4 and 5) seem absurd. Through
these trials the federal subjects are supposed
to take care of the custom system, of the acti-
vity of the federal Central Bank and even mo-
ney printing. Also odd seems to be the aspects
connected with the functioning of the federal
state. Thus, proposing the demilitarization of the
Republic of Moldova, the authors of the text
exclude (art.4 and 5) ensuring the state secu-
rity  from among the federations attributions
and the common competences attributing it
to the federal subjects and placing it corres-
ponding with the art.6.14 from the heading ot-
her matters.
The superior status of the federal subjects in
relation to the federal center is confirmed
through the hierarchy of the normative docu-
ments that normally settle common issues: they
are raised to the rank of organic laws, con-
trasting with the laws adopted by the federal
centre which are just common laws. The sti-
pulations of art.10a and 10b do not make any
difference between these types of laws, which
undermine the hierarchy of the normative do-
cuments and the elementar y juridical order.
Formally the Memorandum announces the
asymmetric character of the federation.  The
formation mechanisms of the public authorities
in the federation, as well as the distribution cha-
racter of the attributions between the 3 levels
(federations competences, joint competences
and the federal subject s competences) seem
to make the term asymmetry seem like a soot-
hing word while the subjects are able to subor-
dinate the federal centers and the  federal ter-
ritory.
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 This asymmetry is thoroughly different of the
asymmetry  proposed by Voronin. The Kozak
Model can be described in the following for-
mula: the federal subjects are state formations
with a large spectrum of rights and sovereign
attributions, while the federal territory  is just a
common territory, without personality, which
could be exerted by oneself, situated in the
subordination (p.3.4) of federal organs and the
competence of the federal subjects. Thus,
Transnistria and Gªgªuzia have the right to full
and unlimited autonomy with a view to solve
their specific problems, based on of the laws
and its autonomous documents, exerted in a
sovereign and guaranteed way by the federal
legislation. However the  federal territory  may
solve these problems by federal laws, adopted
through the Senate (half of which is composed
by representatives of the subjects), through the
executive federal organs, created also with the
large participation of the representatives of the
whole federation (the confirmation of the go-
vernment by the Senate) and a president, also
elected by the population of the reintegrated
state.  In this way the population of Transnistria
and Gªgªuzia has a strong legal status, has
their own sovereignty and independence, whi-
le the population of the rest of Moldova has
no special status and is treated together with
the inhabitants of the two subjects. The federal
subjects have the right to a real form of self-
government, in which the inhabitants from the
rest of the country do not have the right to in-
tervene. However the federal territory  (that is
Republic of Moldova, except the territories con-
trolled at the moment by the secessionist Trans-
nistrian system and the territory belonging to the
Gªgªuz administrative-territorial autonomy),
could not dream of such political autonomy
because the problems of its administration will
be determined solved only with the involvement
of the citizens of Transnistria and Gªgªuzia.
More than that,  in  the per iod 2015-2020
(art.14.11 and 14.12, 14.3), the decisions which
will concern the federal territory will be taken
with the majority of votes of the representatives
of these two federal subjects. Through these is-
sues it is clear that a true integration will not
take place. However the framework proposed
in the document gives more influence to the
ideology of Transnistria and Gªgªuzia .
The asymmetry proposed in the memoran-
dum gives advantage to the federal subjects
over the federal territory. This is also contai-
ned in the normative legislative settlement sys-
tem of the future state. Although art.10b stipu-
lates that the laws of the federal territory are
adopted by the House of Representatives with
the simple half of votes and does not have to
be confirmed by the Senate, the organic fede-
ral laws, which settle the common attributions
sphere have to follow the complete confirma-
tion procedure. In this way the juridical field of
the federal territory, in all matters connected
with its intern problems; can derail very easily
by changing the power relations between tho-
se 71 deputies of the lower Chamber of Parlia-
ment, in advantage of Transnistria. Unlike the
federal territory, the federal subjects have not
only the Constitution but also their own laws are
visibly extracted from the constitutional field of
the federal state, which are not liable to any
auditing or settlement from the federal center.
Thus they have a superior degree of protection
in all the matters connected with the adoption
of normative documents and the decisions that
belong to common competences. Taking into
account, the fact that, at adopting the laws and
decisions on any problems of federal compe-
tence, the subjects play a very important role
(especially in the period 2015 and 2020!). The
rest of the territory will obtain a legislative juri-
dical frame, which prints from the start a com-
plete functional weakness of the federative
center, in comparison with the juridical system
of its subjects. The Senate, formed from a cer-
tain numbers of representatives of the federal
subjects, will have a decisive role in the legisla-
tive process of creating the executive structu-
res, even if the House of Representatives will
meet a rather fair number of deputies, propor-
tionally elected by all the population of the fe-
derative state, thus assuring a larger represen-
tation of the federal territory.
According to art 12.6, the federal gover-
nment is confirmed by the Senate. The federal
government forms the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court; this means that there is a
certain asymmetric degree in the constitutio-
nal guarantees of the future federation. While
the federation subjects have many guarantees
which protect their status, including the right to
secession, the  federal territory  does not have
any guarantees in this sense. The asymmetry of
foreign policy: the subjects have large prero-
gatives in fulfillment of their foreign policy acti-
vities: from the possibilities to develop foreign
relations, signing international agreements to
the obligation of consulting the federal subjects
regarding the stability of foreign relations and
agreements including in the domain of com-
mon prerogatives. The federal territory is de-
prived of this type of political and moral possi-
bilities. Formulation of foreign and economic
foreign policy is limited just to the activities of
the federal organs. However the federal gover-
nment takes into account the wishes of Trans-
nistria and Gªgªuzia  thus not giving a voice to
the  federal territory . The asymmetry of bud-
get and financial matters. While according to
pp.8a and 8b, the budgets of the federal sub-
jects are formed on the account of its own ta-
xes, collected incomes and even subsidies
transmitted as a result of the federal taxes, etc,
the financial administration of the federal ter-
ritories can take place only on the ground of
local taxes, and some required parts of the fe-
deral budget because, according to the stipu-
lations contained in the Memorandum the fe-
deral territory  does not have its own budget!
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In the same situation is the countr y s property.
The subjects have complete sovereign compe-
tences, while the federal territory must comply
with general-federal legislation adopted with
the participation of, and taking into account the
subjects interests, deprived of real possibilities
to exert its own interests. The federal subjects
will have the role of monopolists over the pro-
perty of the future federation situated on their
territory. They will also be able to take supple-
mentary measures to transmit property in the
federal territor y s interest . We can conclude
that, under the guise of this asymmetric Me-
morandum an exclusive statute for the federa-
tions subjects is assured, with fundamental
rights and royal attributions over the federal
center. This will give the possibility to the sepa-
ratist leaders to obtain a dream position in the
structure of the future state. At the same time
there is a total absence of rights for the rest of
the federal territory, creating a specific formu-
la of  federative apartheid, in which the lar-
gest part of the population of the future fede-
ral state, could be deprived of all the elements
of self-government, being fully dependent on
the laws and the adopted decisions under the
dictate of plenipotentiary representatives of the
federal subjects.
This situation can be created in an institutio-
nal context totally inappropriate for represen-
tative democratic principles and the values of
the state of law. For example The House of Re-
presentatives (constituted, according to the
art.9b, on the basis of proportional electorate
system, in a single electoral rayon). Taking into
account the big number of supporters of Trans-
nistria and Moscow from the right bank of the
Dniester, that is on the federal territory , it is
expected that the philo-russian parties will ob-
tain a considerable advantage which would
permit them to penetrate more easily the Hou-
se of Representatives. In this case, the possibi-
lity of the formation of a powerful pro-Moscow
coalition in the Senate as well as in the House
of Representatives will seal the geo-politic ori-
entation and the stability of the political system
for a long time. The stipulation of art. 9b descri-
bes the Constitutional methods of the Senates
components where the exponents of the fede-
ral subjects will dominate also through those 13
proper senators and, probably, a good part
from the number of the other 26, elected from
the rest of the federation, but which, as a result
of the opportunism from the last political chan-
ges could have views influenced perceptibly by
the hegemonic role of Transnistria in the frame
of the new federative structure. Even in the ide-
al case, if 13 senators elected from the rest of
Moldova will be perfectly patriotic for their own
electorate, about 50% from the total number
of the federal subjects senators could block
anytime decisions and laws unacceptable to
Tiraspol.  Let s not forget that, in the new fede-
rative format, the Senate will have extremely
important duties in exerting the federal state
power. The principles exposed in the stipulations
of the art.12b, which define the duties structure
of this political organ, determine it to become
a power ful organism checked by the federal
subjects, and their political ambitions will be
reflected over the federal center. The same
principle of the prevailing of the interests of the
federal subjects are also observed in procedu-
res (art-13.1 and 13.2) of the formation of the
judiciary organs of the federation.
Through these mechanisms the Memoran-
dum proposed by the Russian Federation ac-
tually assures the majority actions of the fe-
deral subjects, which could easily block the fe-
deral center s decisions as is the current situa-
tion. The establishment of such a system is in-
deed, very asymmetric, but also very curious
and internationally unprecedented. The fede-
ral subjects will have almost unlimited possibili-
ties in dominating over the federal organs ap-
plying the federal competences for promoting
their own interests and influencing those state
decisions which will be most convenient to the
political elites, as was the case when the se-
cessionist region was supported from abroad.
Following this formation principles of the fede-
ral power organs, the representatives of the fe-
deral subjects will in fact have unlimited powers
to block and paralyze the activity of the newly
created federation. This will condemn the fe-
deral center to long and systematic crises (pro-
bably similar to the power struggles felt betwe-
en the federal center of the Soviet Union and
the republics before the collapse of the Soviet
system). It is expected that with these condi-
tions Transnistria and Gªgªuzia  will find per-
fectly legal and international ly recognized
methods to disintegrate the newly created fe-
deration and guarantee secession.
According to the stipulations of art.3.6. The
constitutional- juridical statute and the territorial
boundaries of the federal subjects can not be
modified without their consent. Also unequal
is the distribution of the constitutional preroga-
tives and guarantees, conceded to Transnistria
and Gªgªuzia in relation to the federal territo-
r y  (which is not an autonomous subject and,
that is why, it is deprived by the guarantees
mentioned above), this short stipulation prepa-
res the ground for a new military conflict bet-
ween the population of the federal territory 
today, the de facto territory of Republic of
Moldova) and the military troops of Transnistria,
or it  places Republic of Moldova in a degra-
ding situation. Let s not forget that, according
to the declarations of the separatist gover-
nment, RMN owns the control over not just the
localities from the left bank of the Dniester (ex-
cept the villages situated under the jurisdiction
of Chi”inªu), but also over the town Tighina (Ben-
der) and over some localities on the right bank
of the Dniester, which are not be controlled by
the separatist authorities (Varniþa, Copanca). If
we follow the meaning of these stipulations the
result is that these territories should naturally be
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transmitted to the federal Transnistrian subject.
This would bring about a new armed conflict
situation in the region, or unjustified yielding on
the part of Chi”inªu which will not be accep-
ted by these localities.
Completely against the national interests of
the Republic of Moldova are the stipulations of
art.14, regarding the transitory phases of the
document, from the unequal distribution of the
contributions in the federal budget (Transnistria
would have about 1/3 of the Senates members
and exclusive rights to the delegation of its re-
presentatives the formation of the federal exe-
cutive powers). Art.15 is also unacceptable. This
article regards the rule and the adopting prin-
ciples of the future federative Constitution, re-
garding the proceeding of separate vote coun-
ting in the Republic of Moldova and Transnis-
tria. Besides the disrespectful character of the
idea of electoral country reintegration on se-
parate grounds, this idea of separate counting
seems to take into account certain internal
plans and obvious, safety measures necessary
to the secessionist government for controlling
the electorate segment of the region. This pro-
cedure could condemn the adoption process
of the federal Constitution to the acceptance
of two possible variants: either the adoption of
a Constitution which entirely serves the mercan-
tile political interests of the secessionist leaders
from Tiraspol, or the rejection of this Constitu-
tion and the failure of the entire action inter-
national guaranteed, the failure also serving
for strengthening the positions of Tiraspol.
The adoption corresponding with the stipu-
lations of the art.3.7, states that the official lan-
guage of the federation will be Russian, with the
guarantee of maintaining this statute forever,
due to the impossibility to revise the Constitu-
tion (p.10d), if the Transnistrian subject does not
agree with this.
Proposing the demilitarization of Moldova
without the necessary guarantees for the im-
plementation of the agreement seems to as-
sure a special and important role to Moscow in
this stage of transition to the new federal state.
Moldova will be demilitarized step by step; and
then someone will have to assure the guaran-
tee of this process and the inviolability of the
federal state, eventually, against some foreign
states. In this context, colonel L.Ivashov, the
representative of the defense minister of the
Russian Federation, stated that: the adoption
of the Memorandum will require not just main-
taining the level of Russian troops in Moldova,
but also increasing the level. Respectively, the
demilitarized statute of Republic of Moldova is
necessary to block the cooperation of RM with
NATO and with the defense structures of the EU.
On the other hand, the purposeful difficulty to
modify the Constitution (the procedure of mo-
dification with only 4/5 majority of the Senates,
concedes to Transnistria almost unlimited pos-
sibilities to block any changes which it consi-
ders unacceptable) make impossible any type
of cultural, economic or political integration
with Romania of any of the subjects, let alone
the federal territory , not even speaking of the
right to secession guaranteed to the federal
subjects in this case.
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The system of local public administration in-
troduced at the end of 1998 did not have time
to demonstrate its positive and negative as-
pects, because already at the beginning of
2001, the newly elected government declared
the system  fail ing and  faulty  and that it
would soon be replaced with the old system,
although questionably named traditional. The
local authorities of RM as well as the CLPR ex-
perts experienced some very unpleasant mo-
ments when the political authorities from RM
avoided consulting them in every possible way
concerning the planned reform. This started with
limitation and censorship of the public debate
in the official press and ended with the autho-
rities not publishing the draft law on local pu-
blic administration. After the first reading the law
was adopted, however the parliamentarians
had only fragmentary knowledge of the reform
that had already started in November 2001.
On the whole this vision contained too few
new elements for it to be treated seriously by
civil society and the opposition. Keeping this in
mind a juridical formula appreciated by some
experts as hazardous proposed the revision of
the elements, principles and instruments nee-
ded for the duties of local public administra-
tion. The authors of the law proposed the dis-
mantling of the entire system of local compe-
tences, the structure of sub-national centers
and the government s territorial offices (prefec-
tures) installed in the rayons through reinstalling
an old model, which existed before 1998.  Ho-
wever this time in a radical-populist formula,
phrased as: bringing the administration to citi-
zens. An analysis of the structural deficiencies
of the law was also made in the report of an
expert from the Congress of Local and Regio-
nal Power of the European Council, Prof. John
OLouglin21(10).
The changes that were produced can be
considered a combination of what was happe-
ning already until 1998 with some elements of
administrative decentralization, the local auto-
nomy was just the scenery of the public admi-
nistration system. After the local elections in May
2003, during the Conference The Process of
Decentralization in Moldova: Recent Events and
Future Tendencies organized in Chi”inªu on the
8 th and 9 th of July 2003 by the Congress of Lo-
cal and Regional Powers of the European Coun-
cil, the state authorities admitted some mista-
kes in the legislative framework of local public
administration. They promised that the legisla-
tion would be changed according to the stipu-
lations of the European Charter and would im-
plement the recommendations made by the
European experts. Following the recommenda-
tions of the conference a serious nationwide
discussion was supposed to have taken place
discussing efficient mechanisms to increase the
efficiency of local public administration. Regret-
fully, this has not happened so far, except for
some insignificant modifications of the legisla-
tion.  The system of local public administration
practically remained the same, with inefficient
institutions and mechanisms, and many gaps.
In general local public administration became
weaker, lacking coherence and became more
dependent on the central authorities than be-
fore the reform. To demonstrate this, we propo-
se to follow some practical aspects of the terri-
torial administrative system, accompanying
them with reflections and the analysis of this
domain.
2.1 The impact of the new
LPA legislation:
Returning to the rayons did not make a po-
sitive difference on the citizens perception in
2003. In November based on the results of the
Public Opinion Barometer22 (11) around 47,5%
from the respondents considered that the level
of public services remained the same as in
2002. The position of local public authorities
also remained unchanged, in the public opi-
nion (40,6%), while 34,8% could not give an
answer to the question. The most profound im-
pact the return to the rayons had on the public
administration system was its psychological ef-
fect on the civil servants and mayors. There is a
stronger tendency to find solutions to local pro-
blems at the central level than at the local le-
vel. Quite quickly it has become normal that
the central government gives indications and
establishes targets for local governments. Instru-
ments for achieving this are the frequent visits
in the countr y by parliamentarians who remind
local authorities of the obligations to serve their
party s interests.
Initially, the implementation of law nr.764-XV
and Law nr.781-XV was suggested for spring
2002 at the same time with the organization
and the anticipated date of local elections. In
concordance with the Constitutional Court s
II. Local Autonomy and the Process
of Decentralization in Moldova in 2003
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Resolution nr.10 from February the19th 2002 For
the constitutional control of the Parliament s
Resolution nr.807-XV from February the 5 th 2002
Regarding the establishment of the date of
local elections the local elections were post-
poned until May 2003, and the implementation
of the nominated Laws was suspended, too,
until the spring of 2003. Law nr.764-XV (27 th of
December 2001) and Law nr.186-XV (Novem-
ber the 6 th 1998) with the modifications and
completions were constitutionally controlled
(the Resolutions of the Constitutional Court nr.71
from  December the 21st 1999, nr.12 from March
the 5th 2002 and nr.13 from March the 14 th 2002).
As a result, certain stipulations from the law re-
garding local public administration were decla-
red unconstitutional, and the law regarding the
territorial-administrative organization of Repu-
blic of Moldova was recognized as constitutio-
nal. Considering this, the absence of an articu-
late conception over the benefits of returning
to the old rayons and the absence of public
consensus over the reform stimulated protest
and tension in society. Without undermining
Moldovas authority to promote its own territo-
rial reform, the CPLRE underlined several times
that it regrets this reform,  because it greeted
and actively encouraged the territorial reform
of 1999 as a positive step to a true regionaliza-
tion of the country.23
On March 18 th 2003, the Parliament of the
Republic of Moldova adopted a new Law re-
garding local public administration. On the
whole, the law from 2003 as the one from 1998,
develop in the first section the constitutional
principles settled by art.109 which establish that
the public administration in the territorial-admi-
nistrative units is based on the principles of lo-
cal autonomy, decentralization of public servi-
ces, of eligibility and consulting citizens in lo-
cal problems of special interest. Art.3 from the
Law reproduces the constitutional settlements,
and in the second paragraph of the article
mentioned establishes that the authorities of
local public administration have financial au-
tonomy, the right of initiative in issues regarding
the administration of local public problems,
implementing the conditions of the law, the
authority in the limits of the administrated terri-
tory. Art.4 of the law stipulates that the territo-
rial-administrative unit is a legal entity of pu-
blic right and dispose a patrimony in conditions
of the law. Art.6 settles the relations between
the central and the local government, as well
as between the authorities of the first and se-
cond level. These relations have as a basis the
principles of autonomy, legality, transparency
and cooperation in solving common problems.
However this law repeated the systematic er-
rors of the old legislation. The reform of local
autonomy has remained at a level of empty
declarations; the competences given to the
local public authorities have not been cove-
red with enough financial resources and the
absence of the prefect institution which was
repealed makes that the relations between the
authorities of the first level and second level has
turned into a relation of subordination.
Art.5 determines the local councils in villa-
ges and towns as legislative authorities and
mayors as executive authorities in the process
of local autonomy. This paragraph does not
determine the quality of the subject of local
autonomy or the rayon council; the authors of
the law simply reproduce art.112 from the Con-
stitution entitled: The village and town authori-
ties. This article determines the status of the
subjects of local autonomy as the local coun-
cils and mayors, referring only to the village and
town authorities. But art.109 of the Constitution
says very clearly that public administration in
the territorial administrative units is based on the
principles of local autonomy, decentralization
of the public services etc. So, we have to un-
derstand that these arrangements also apply
to rayon councils, as a rayon is also a territorial
administrative unit.
The avoidance of the implementation in the
new Law regarding local public administration
can create the impression that the rayon aut-
horities do not work autonomously. The princi-
ple of local autonomy does not refer to them.
The relations between the rayons and the cen-
tral authorities are not relations of cooperation
but subordination.
According to this resolution the government
does not have prefects in the territory as direct
representatives. To keep influence in the region
the government may try to let the rayon chiefs
do the same work as the prefects under the old
system, thus taking local autonomy away from
the rayons.
An important part of the law is that the ar-
rangements regarding deconcentrated public
services have disappeared from the text. Only
in the first article - Essential notions  it is ex-
plained that deconcentrated public services
are under the subordination of the central ad-
ministration. These services are situated in the
area of the territorial unit. The definition is cor-
rect, but the law does not specify who is in char-
ge of these deconcentrated services or what
the relation is between the deconcentrated
services and the local authorities. Obviously,
these services are not under the subordination
of the rayon chief, who is responsible to the
government for the administration of the ray-
on. This explains why in art.60 which settles the
main competences of the rayon chief, the de-
concentrated public services are not mentio-
ned.  There is no definition what competences
the rayon chief has over these services, who
coordinates the services or who is in charge of
the services. Neither is there any text what are
the relations with the ministries and departments
or is it defined what the responsibilities are of
the services towards the rayon authorities.
The problems of the public authority s com-
petences remained without many changes re-
garding the decentralization mechanism of
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public services. At the round table, which took
place on the 22-23 rd of October 2003 with par-
ticipation of government representatives, the
Parliamentary Commission for local autonomy,
as well as the experts of the European Council,
the conclusion was that fair and efficient distri-
bution of the competences and responsibilities
in local public administration remains a diffi-
cult problem for the central authorities, and is
still not clarified by this law. Thus, as in the old
law, in the new law of local public administra-
tion (March 2002), instead of delimitation of
the domains of activity  the formula of delimi-
tation of competences was kept. This does not
solve the problem of legal confusions and ine-
vitable conflicts between different levels of aut-
hority. Art.10 resolves the competences of the
territorial units at the first level, and art.11 resol-
ves the competences of the public authorities
of the second level. Such a settlement will ine-
vitably lead to some overlap, not of compe-
tences but of activities. The competences of
local public authorities are settled in other arti-
cles, such as: art.18, settling the competences
of the local council, art.34  the mayor s com-
petences and art.49  the competences of the
rayon council.
The innovation introduced in the law relates
to the delegated competences, which actual-
ly does not constitute a violation of the rights of
local autonomy, but an explanation of the juri-
dical relations between the central and local
administration.  The European Charter contains
specific stipulations, in art.5 (pt.5) regarding the
situations through which the delegation of
competencies takes place by a central or re-
gional authority, the local public administration
authorities have to benefit, as much as possi-
ble, of the freedom to adapt their action at lo-
cal conditions. The delegation of competen-
ces was not done in a correct way, because
the main law of the local public administration
has to stipulate the possibility of the rayon and
central authorities to concede, if necessary
delegated competences, with the necessary
financial resources for covering the cost of
competence duties. There is a big difference
between obliging the local authorities to fulfill
the tasks of the state policies, and setting up
favorable conditions (including financial, ma-
terial, juridical, etc.).  Through which, exerting
these functions can mean a benefit for the
authorities having a juridical autonomous per-
sonality.
The fact that these delegated competences
were, from the start, introduced in the main law
and unequally distributed between the commu-
nal, city, and the rayon councils makes us be-
lieve that the legislation went on a wrong path.
Many of these competencies are closer to de-
concentrated public services thus its adminis-
tration should be done by the government s
representatives in the territory and not by the
local authorities. If the law has given local aut-
horities certain competencies, then in the same
law means should be established how and whe-
re the local authorities should present informa-
tion on the achievement of their goals etc.
In case the law conceded these competen-
ces to the local authorities the controlling aut-
hority should also have been established. For
example to whom should the information regar-
ding the quality and the extension of fulfilling
these tasks be presented, where do monthly
reports on the fulfilled tasks go, establishing 
respectively  a new subordinate relation bet-
ween the authorities (central and local). This
represents a major juridical blunder, and a vio-
lation of the European Charter, (i.e. of the con-
cept of local autonomy specified in art.3 pt.1.,
about the right and the effective capacity of
the LPA authorities to solve and administrate,
as part of the law, in a proper name, and in the
interest of the local population, an important
part of the public problems).
Numerous competences delegated to the
local public authorities of the first and second
level cancel, in fact, the autonomy and coo-
peration relations settled by the Constitution of
Republic of Moldova, subordinating the local
authorities (the mayors) to the rayon chief. Thus,
through art.12 the delegated competences for
the authorities of the first level are resolved:
such as: civil protection, maintaining the pu-
blic order, the military administrative activity, the
protection of natural resources etc. The same
competence through art.13 is delegated to the
rayon authorities: civil protection, maintaining
the public order, the mil itar y-administrative
activity, the social protection of the population,
the protection of the natural resources etc. This
creates a conflicting frame which can bring
about authority conflicts and abuse, through
creating subordinate relations between two le-
vels of autonomous levels, if we quote from the
local public administration law.
The central authorities, through the stipula-
tions of the law reserved the right to affect the
procedure of administrative control regarding
the opportunity of using the allotted resources
and the undertaken actions, which is a natural
thing in case the local public authorities are
allotted supplementary resources from the na-
tional budget for the administration of the de-
legated services. The new law has been applied
from the 25 th of May 2003, immediately after
the local elections, and the financial resources
for the delegated competences were not ear-
marked in the strengthened budget for the cur-
rent year, and respectively, hasnt been trans-
ferred to the local collectivities until now, which
doubts the present verifying and supervising
mechanism of fulfi l lment of the delegated
functions of the local authorities.
A more serious problem is, who is the com-
petent authority which should assure reliable
guarantees against inter ference by the autho-
rities, or against the attempts to demand from
the local authorities the fulfillment of duties that
are not covered in the budget. In this area, the
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law does not give a conclusive answer, which
makes us believe that the the competence
delimitation is more a trick, blocking out in fact,
the transfer of competences to the local level
without transferring adequate financial resour-
ces for these competences. We have to men-
tion that the return to the old rayons did not in-
troduce an active invigoration in the territorial-
administrative units. And we are not sure that
the populations from the rayons feel the bene-
fits of this change. One thing which was achie-
ved is the closeness of the bureaucratic appa-
ratus to the citizens. For demonstrating the re-
duction of the bureaucratic apparatus a com-
pletely inappropriate action has been set up in
the villages and the mayoralties of the com-
munes. The positions of the court clerk, expert
for sport and youth, and expert for military evi-
dence have been cut. The wages of the survey
engineer and the tax collector positions have
been halved. As a matter of fact, from the
mayor s apparatus only the bookkeeper and the
communes secretary remained unchanged.
Paradoxically, through this we can assert that
the public administration did not get closer to
the citizens, but went further away.
2.2. The May 2003 Local Elections:
The organization of the local elections of this
year coincided with the territorial-administrati-
ve reform and the main laws for the functio-
ning of local public administration, modified in
March 2003 as a result of the recommenda-
tions made by the CPLRE experts. The rush with
which the authorities adopted the new laws
caused political tension with the political op-
position and civil society, but also raised uncer-
tainty with the citizens towards the stakes of the
ballot. In addition to the replacement of the
officials of the regional authorities (from 10 ju-
dets to 33 rayons) also new mayors and coun-
cilors had to be elected at the local level due
to the raise in the number of communes from
644 to 898. These territorial-administrative mo-
difications increased the political instability in
the country as well as the uncertainty for the
locally elected officials. The citizens had to vote
for 898 new mayors and for 11,935 councilors
at the local and regional level. For the local
elections of May 2003 (organized for the third
time since 1990) there were 47,265 candida-
tes from 11 political parties, two electoral blocks
had been registered and there were 1,544 in-
dependent candidates (including 723 who ran
for mayor). The international and local obser-
vers24 mentioned serious incidents in their re-
ports, and noted that these elections were a
step back from the elections of 1999.
There were numerous cases of intimidation
of opposition candidates and the supporters of
some non-communist parties;
• Restraining and even arresting some
candidates running for mayor;
• Unequal reflection of the campaign in
the printed and electronic state media;
• The application of pressure on journa-
lists;
• Interventions in the electoral campaign
by government officials;
• The use of public means for the bene-
fit of the candidates of the governing
party.
As a result of the local ballot from May-June
2003, the CPM accumulated 367 of the 892
mayor mandates, or 41,14%12, becoming the
statistic leader of this ballot. The CPM obtained
47,89% of the councilor mandates in the rayon
and local councils. According to the CEC com-
muniquØ from the 11 th of June,  the Democrat
Party accumulated, as a result of 2 ballot tours,
72 mandates (8,07%); ASL Moldova noastrª -
189 (21,19%); The Democrat-Agrar Party - 18
(2,02%); the Socialist Party - 3 (0,34%); The Po-
pular Christian Democrat Party - 20 (2,25%); The
Professional s movement Speranþa-Nadejda -
3 (0,34%); The electoral block PSL-PSD - 43
(4,82%); The Socialist Party - 2 (0,22%); The so-
cial-pol i t ical movement Ravnopravie - 2
(0,22%); The Centrist Union - 17 (1,91%). Inde-
pendent candidates obtained 156 mandates
for the position of mayor (17,49%). CPM is fol-
lowed statistically speaking by ASL Moldova
noastrª - 20,05% and 21,1%; The Popular Chris-
tian Democrat Party (PPCD) - 8,89% and 6,6%;
the electoral block PSL-PSD - 4,44% and 4,9%;
the Democrat Party (PD) - 7,69% and 8,9%; the
Democrat-Agrar Party (PDAM) - 2,6% and 2,7%;
the Socialist Party (PS) - 0,2% and 0,1%, the Pro-
fessional s Movement Speranþa-Nadejda -
0,18% and 0,2%; The social-political Ravno-
pravie - 0,85% and 0,3%; the Republican Par-
ty (PR) - 0,08% and 0,1%; the Centrist Union
(UCM) - 1,59% and 1,9%; the independent can-
didates - 5,54% and 7,5%. The social-political
movement Forþa nouª and the Socialist Party
will have representatives only in the village and
the city councils.
As a result of the detailed examination of the
intimidation cases of the candidates and the
violation of the citizens electoral rights, the in-
ternational observers could ascertain that the
Electoral Codes Principles were violated. Espe-
cially with regard to the principle of equal chan-
ce and the free will of the voters (par. 2-3 of
the Code of good conduct in elections) (par.3-
1). Based on detailed observation of these elec-
tions, the Delegation proposed:
• The close monitoring of the evolution
of local and regional democracy in the
RM, including recommendation 110
and resolution 132;
• The exact validation of the election
results by the court;
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• Following the recently adopted legis-
lation in the European Charter s spirit;
• Analyze the reviewed Electoral Code;
necessary due to the many modifica-
tions concerning ballot secrecy and the
electoral means used by the candida-
tes and parties;
• The training of newly elected officials,
taking into account their large numbers;
• Supplying assistance for the imple-
mentation of new legislation in LPA.
The confirmation of the new local authorities
in their elected functions court decisions did not
end political rivalries. For example the city of
Chi”inªu, whose statute suffered certain chan-
ges in August, as a result of disappearance of
the Mayoralty and transmitting to the City Coun-
cil the competences which previously belon-
ged to the Mayoralty confirm the continuation
of the inter-party rivalries through other means
than the electoral ones. We should mention that
in the middle of the year after the local elec-
tions from May  June 2003, the City Council of
Chi”inªu  remains a difficult structure and is
hard to administrate. The contradictory party
interests go to extremes for the adoption of
decisions, the defining of the agenda with pro-
blems settled to discuss the appointment of the
sector pretors and the chief of the city sub-divi-
sions). The CPM faction demanded, after they
installed 2 of the 4 vice-mayors, at least 2 pre-
tor positions of the 5 sectors of the capital, but
also leadership positions in many departments
and city directorates. After the new law regar-
ding local public administration entered in for-
ce (March 2003), the mayoralties were dismis-
sed as decisional organs, all their competen-
ces were delegated to the local councils, which
are thus obliged to examine not only matters
regarding the strategic development of the lo-
cality, but also minor problems like certifying the
ownership right to rent a room.
Taking into account the intricate problems
which have to be solved by the council of Chi-
”inªu  (over 1 million inhabitants together with
the localities included in the city limits), it is
obvious that the City Council s task can hardly
be accomplished in these conditions. On the
1st of December there were around 3,463 de-
mands from economic agents and citizens on
the agenda of the City Council. If these de-
mands were not examined it could lead to le-
gal action under the Law regarding Petitions,
for damages and time wasted by the citizens.
As there is an equal balance between the CPM
and the rest of the councilors (who set up a fac-
tion called democratic Chi”inªu ) polit ical
act iv i t ies have been paralyzed in the last
months. The only decisions which could be ad-
opted were those agreed to by the councilor
of the social-political movement Ravnopravie,
who declared that he will vote only in the in-
terest of the citizens, meaning in fact the avai-
lable assets for various deals with the rival fac-
tions.
2.3. The State of Financial Autonomy:
After all, the new law regarding local public
administration has not brought radical changes
to the strengthening of financial autonomy. As
in the old law it is stipulated that the authorities
of local public administration have the right to
their own financial resources, proportional to
their competences, to use freely in the interest
of the local collectivity. These financial resour-
ces of the municipality come from local taxes
which completely remain in the municipality,
as well as from special means earned through
public institutions which ensure the normal func-
tioning and the performance of paid services.
According to the Law regarding local public fi-
nance the budgetary system of the territorial
administrative units is made up from two levels.
The I st level is made up by the budget of: villa-
ges, communes, towns and municipalities the
IInd level is made up of the budget of the ray-
ons, the territorial administrative unit Gªgªuzia
and the Chi”inªu municipality. The incomes of
local public administration (the Ist level budgets)
are constituted from: (1) the own incomes that
completely remains in the locality; (2) special
means; (3) deducts from the general state in-
comes; (4) transfers.
The incomes and expenses of the territorial
administrative units are earmarked for each fi-
nancial year in the respective budgets appro-
ved by the local rayon councils and the muni-
cipal council of Chi”inªu under the conditions
of the law. The budgets of the territorial admi-
nistrative units: vi l lages, communes, towns,
municipalities, and rayons constitute indispen-
sable elements, which are elaborated, appro-
ved and executed in conditions of financial
autonomy.  Incomes are earmarked for each
budgetary year. The annual expenses of the
budgets are approved in the limits of the avai-
lable financial resources. However the decen-
tral ization process in RM was implemented
through the decentralization of the public ser-
vices without following a real decentralization
of the financial resources, including the lack of
capacity of the newly formed local public aut-
horities to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the
legislation. In the last years several legal modi-
fications have been implemented which led to
confusion regarding the earmark of incomes
between the budgets from all levels, regarding
the formation of income resources, especially
the incomes of the local and rayon budgets.
Because the deduct norms (rates) of the lo-
cal budget are established by the rayon coun-
cil, this will not stimulate the creation of favora-
ble conditions of economic activity for local
authorities and local private initiative. If local
authorities do not have stable incomes for their
budgets, they will be put on hold and will de-
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pend on the imposed quotas of the state bud-
get, which contributes to the diminishing of the
interest of increasing tax collections, and fin-
ding local solutions. An example is the land tax,
which was transformed in a regular tax, and the
mayoralties are more lenient in the control over
the collection of this tax, because it will be trans-
ferred to the regional budget and only a small
part will remain in the local budget. Similar si-
tuations will happen with the tax on real esta-
tes.
The reduced tax decentralization in Moldo-
va together with the specific nature of the for-
mation of the local budget makes the local
public authorities dependent on the central
public organs, having no decision making fre-
edom on financial issues. The existent system
defines the normative of expenses calculated
with the number of inhabitants; the budget
deficit is covered by the central public admi-
nistration through transfers. As long as these big
disparities exist in the formation of the local
public incomes, it will not be possible to aban-
don the normative expense system, which has
to be reviewed in such a way, so the local pu-
blic authorities can handle the existent pro-
blems. The raising of the normative expenditu-
res supposes the realization of financial decen-
tralization or the redistribution of the public in-
comes for local public authority. The existing
local taxes and the majority of the tax system
in general in the republic are not favorable for
local government. Of the 14 local taxes only
four taxes work effectively in the territory, while
the rest are rarely used. Most of the tax revenu-
es come from Chi”inªu , who take most of the
taxes in an area of over 200 km.
Another feature of the right to take autono-
mous decisions is connected with the comple-
tion of the local public expenses. We have
mentioned previously that, the existent norma-
tive expenditures, which are settled by the Mi-
nistry of Finance, undermine the effective ca-
pacity of the local public authorities in the fi-
nancial domain. The structure of the local pu-
blic expenses: the transfer volume is determi-
ned by the settled normatives, which reduce
the degree of local autonomy, because local
autonomy is strictly limited by the proceedings
of allotting and supervising financial resources
which do not belong exclusively to them. The
limitation of the freedom of LPA to take respon-
sible and autonomous decisions leads to the
inhibition of the local public authorities, becau-
se they can only take autonomous decisions on
the over incomes (which surpasses 100% of
the budgeted income, but not more than
120%). However less than 10% of communities
are in this category. The rest is entirely or par-
tially dependent on the normatives of the re-
gional or central organs.
At the end of 2003, the Parliament appro-
ved the new law regarding the local public fi-
nances. At the first glance it seems that the new
law is relatively democratic and suitable, and
the only innovation seems to be the introduc-
tion of a special financial statute for municipa-
lity of Bªlþi.  However if we look deeper we can
observe that in the domain of income collec-
tion and distribution significant changes have
been made. First of all the number of local ta-
xes has been reduced. It is true that, of the 14
local taxes established in the old law, in fact
only three were really used, and it was neces-
sary to change something. If the central aut-
horities are not capable to elaborate taxes
which would work in the territory, it would be
better if the local public organs have the right
to introduce new taxes, or at least have the right
to come with legislative initiatives regarding the
introduction of new local taxes.
Another essential modification relates to the
types of deductible incomes; however from this
list VAT is absent. The local experts estimate that
only in 2004, local authorities will lose around
220 million lei to the state budget due to the
VAT payments, without taking into account the
decrease of their own tax collection and the
declining image of local government.
This decision will have two important econo-
mical and political impacts on LPA. First of all
the importance of transfers from the state will
grow in the structure of local public incomes,
which will lead to a larger dependency of LPA
on the central government. Second LPA will be
deprived of considerable income according to
our estimations around 200 million lei annually,
this sum is formed from the over-incomes ob-
tained from the VAT gathering, which according
to the law remain in LPA. Usually these over-
incomes are used by communities for capital
investments and economic development.  Of
the many laws which regulate the capital mar-
ket one of the most important is the law of lo-
cal public finances, article 14, which settle the
access to the capital market and who has the
right to appeal for loans. A positive modifica-
tion is that the number of subjects who have
this right has been increased.
2.4. The State
of Municipal Ownership:
Effective local autonomy is unimaginable
without patrimonial and financial resources and
the necessary instruments for maintaining and
assuring the execution of decisions and local
development projects. The Civil Code, the law
regarding local public administration and the
Law regarding the public property of the terri-
torial  administrative units, offer LPA financial
means, which they can administer according
to their needs. Ideal legislation is an important
condition, but it is not enough to solve the pro-
blems of the patrimony based on the principles
of local autonomy and the free market. In the
Republic of Moldova there is a large differen-
ce between the legal rights of local government
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and the real level of local autonomy. Certain
parts of the legislative framework contradict
other parts of the law, while others resolve only
a part of all the social relations which appear
in the process of administrating the public pa-
trimony.
Generally speaking, the state policies on
municipal property can be characterized only
as a formal recognition of the right of munici-
pal property. At the same time the state poli-
cies on municipal property are characterized
through involvement in the competence of lo-
cal authorities. This happens through forced
goods and debts transmissions to the local aut-
horities; the indirect expropriations of the mu-
nicipal property goods; the delegation of com-
petencies without financial resources, the ad-
option of decisions which change the local
patrimony without consulting local authorities,
the limitation of access to justice on defense
of the patrimonial interests and rights etc. etc.
In this respect the following problems should
be mentioned:
Through the adoption of the Civil Code and
the law concerning local public administration
formally the delimitation of municipal property
was resolved in a modern and effective man-
ner, dividing municipal ownership into different
categories of goods which are property of the
territorial-administrative units. The main problem
is that there is a large gap between the juridi-
cal theory and practice. The majority of the res-
pective legislative documents were not made
according to the stipulations of the Civil Law
and the law concerning the local public admi-
nistration, thus maintaining the basic contradic-
tions between the stipulations of the different
relevant normative documents. On the other
hand, the new concept of local government is
not yet well known, and is being promoted and
implemented by authorities at different levels
keeping the confusion, the contradictions and
the uncertainty of the status of municipal pro-
perty. As a result, all the positive new legal stan-
dards regarding the property of the territorial 
administrative units are inefficient and inappli-
cable. The central authorities have adopted
abusive and contradictor y normative acts,
which do not correspond and even contradict
the current legal concept of the municipal pro-
perty (e.g.: the Law of local public finance 
2003 and the budget Law for 2004).
Until now there is no clear delimitation of state
property from the property of the territorial units:
counties, towns (cities) and villages (commu-
nes). This situation gives the central authorities
the possibil ity for adopting, various abusive
documents, through which the rights and the
patrimonial interests of the local community are
violated. A problem is that there is no clear
demarcation between the public domain and
the private domain of the ownership rights of
the municipalities. In spite of the fact that the
law concerning the public property of the terri-
torial units, the Civil code and the law concer-
ning local public authority s stipulates the deli-
mitation of the public domain from the private
one there is not yet a clear mechanism to
achieve this. Without this mechanism the con-
fusion remains over the juridical status of va-
rious municipal properties. It is not clear which
goods are in the civil circuit (can be used free-
ly, including changing ownership) and those
goods taken out of the civil circuit (cannot be
used freely, even through privatization). Thus
various public goods which should stay out of
the civil circuit may enter this circuit and be sold
(e.g. cultural centers, municipal companies,
cinemas etc.) while on the other hand goods
which should be in the civil circuit and can be
profitable to the local authorities may not be
sold. This confusion limits the local authorities
in the correct and effective use of municipal
property.
Until now the conditions and the procedures
for changing the status of goods from the pu-
blic to the private domain are not settled clear-
ly. Changing the status of goods from the pu-
blic to the private domain and vice verse leads
to a change in the juridical status of these go-
ods. As a result of this transfer, the properties
from the public domain are included in the ci-
vil circuit, thus making it possible for them to
change ownership, including through privatiza-
tion. If property from the private domain is trans-
ferred to the public domain, this property is then
not allowed to change ownership. To avoid
confusion and abuse in this domain (the illegal
transfer of goods from one domain to another),
it is very important to have clear and precise
conditions and procedures for changing the
status of the property of local government. In
this respect, the Law concerning local public
administration and other normative documents
do not stipulate what are the criteria and the
compulsory conditions for the transfer of pro-
perty from one domain to another. More than
that, the conditions and criteria are different for
transferring goods from the public domain to
the private domain than for the transfer from
the private domain to the public domain, wit-
hout affecting the rights and the interests of
other subjects (for example the creditors).
There is no comprehensive register, which
contains all the properties of local government
and their juridical status. The existence of a
comprehensive register of the local government
property is one of the important conditions for
an efficient development of local government
property. At the moment the local registration
system of local patrimony is too complicated,
confusing and does not correspond with most
of the current legislation. In other words it is ina-
dequate and inefficient. Particularly, the patri-
monial registr y is kept by different people (se-
cretary, survey engineer, book-keeper etc.), in
this respect there are survey registers, account
books of the assets and record books of fixed
assets. At the same time, the stipulations, (of
the Civil Code and of the Law regarding the
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local public administration) are not taken into
account. According to these laws a detailed
separate record of state private property assets
and that of the territorial-administrative units of
both the public and private sphere should be
kept.
A distinct feature of state policy in the sphe-
re of municipal property represents the adop-
tion of certain resolutions by the central public
authorities that deprive local government of
certain properties and income. These resolu-
tions are reached without consulting the local
authorities and breach the legal framework. For
example government resolution nr. 1202 of
8.11.2001 regarding measures to settle the use
of water pools, government resolution nr. 891
from 17.07.2003 concerning the installment of
the Medical Assistance Emergency Service and
the government resolution regarding the trans-
fer of local government real estate to the state
balance. In all these cases, the government
tried to give the local government property
(municipal property assets) either to private
agents (water pools), or to new organizations,
without the permission of the local authorities
and without taking into account the rights and
interests of the local collectivities. Some of the-
se cases went to the Constitutional Court. Go-
vernment resolution. nr. 1202 has been found
to be against the constitution and violates the
property rights and the competence of the lo-
cal authorities (5  August 2003). Government
resolution nr. 891, will be in court soon.
The process of delimitation of the property
of the local authorities from the property of the
central state shows that the central authorities
neglect the patrimonial rights and interests of
the local authorities. This happens despite a
legal framework in which the central authori-
ties are obligated to consult the local authori-
ties during the delimitation process. The cen-
tral authorities, against the resolutions and re-
commendations of the constitutional court are
still adopting documents against the law.  This
is intolerable in a state of law. Especially, G.R.
nr.959 from 04.08.2003 through which the ma-
jority of the underwater terrains have been trans-
ferred to the state, is a gross violation of the
law. These terrains have been transferred to the
state without consulting local authorities and
without giving valid reasons (national interest)
for the transfer. The majority of these terrains are
not of national but local interest, this is a legal
reason for considering them local public pro-
perty. As a result of such settlements the state
owns up to 60% of the land in some territorial
units, while land is one of the main sources of
income for the local budget.
The access of LPA to justice is an indispensa-
ble element of real and effective local auto-
nomy. The limited access to justice is a distinct
feature of the state policy in relation to local
authorities. According to the modifications of
art.4 of the administrative solicitor s Law, local
authorities in Moldova are currently deprived of
the right to fight normative acts adopted by the
central government in court. This is a problem
because the majority of the decisions in the
domain of LPA (especially relating to municipal
property) are adopted through normative go-
vernment resolutions. Thus, for example, in the
above-mentioned case (G.R. concerning the
delimitation of public property); if a local pu-
blic authority does not agree with the decision
it is not able to go to court. Through this access
to justice is being limited. The only possibility to
defend oneself is by addressing the Constitu-
tional Court, which is an indirect and quite dif-
ficult way of defending the rights and interests
of the local authorities.
A specific category of policy used by the
central authorities are the various directives,
dispositions, circulars and other documents wit-
hout juridical power, signed by top level lea-
ders of the central administration (e.g. vice pri-
me minister). Local authorities are given these
obligatory instructions and indications concer-
ning the administration of local patrimony, in
spite of legal provisions. These legal provisions
stipulate that the relation between public aut-
horities of different levels is based on equality
and collaboration and not on subordination.26
In the same category we find cases of haras-
sment and intimidation of mayors. This may
happen opening (often ordered during an elec-
toral period) an exaggerated penal and/or ad-
ministrative file, based on supposed inadequa-
te administration of the local patrimony and
local public funds.
The analysis of the legislative framework, as
well as the investigations done by IDIS Viitorul
leads to the conclusion that the Republic of
Moldova lacks an integral normative act that
could settle the major problems regarding pu-
blic property of the territorial units. The main is-
sues of this law should be the: subjects, objects,
the juridical regime, ways and procedures of
passing assets from the public to the private
domain, procurement and liquidation of pro-
perty rights of the territorial units and the juridi-
cal guarantee to defend property rights, in ac-
cordance with the provisions and stipulations
of the European Charter, Civil Code and local
public administration Law in the Republic of
Moldova.
2.5. The Statue of Locally Elected
Officials and the Internal
Organization of LPA:
A statute for locally elected officials is im-
portant for the local council to work efficiently
and to fulfill their duties within the framework of
local government. An important part of the sta-
tute must ensure, according to the stipulation
of art.7 of the European Charter, the freedom
to exercise their mandate. The law regarding
the statute of locally elected officials adopted
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on April the 19 th, 1995 is still in force and has
not yet undergone changes after the abolition
of the judet councils and the appearance of
the rayon councilors and the rayon president
function, even this being an elected position.
Besides the provisions in the law regarding lo-
cal public administration, the public service law
and the Electoral Code; the Law concerning
locally elected officials specifies the conditions
of eligibility, juridical incompatibilities and re-
strictions in exerting the mandate of locally
elected leader. These laws stipulate the juridi-
cal and social guarantees, as well as the du-
ties regarding the achievement of local self
government actions, in accordance with the
legislation in force. The statute of locally elec-
ted officials is applicable to all councilors elec-
ted for municipal and rayon councils and the
deputies of the UTAG popular assembly. The law
lists functions incompatible with the mayor or
councilor mandate, with provisions similar to
other countries, to avoid situations when these
functions would influence work in the local
council. For example obtaining personal profit
after adopting resolutions with a social or eco-
nomic impact. These incompatibilities are not
abstract, but have a clear and well-defined
aim, to exclude embezzlement after dishonestly
using the power of the councilor or mayor man-
date.
We emphasize here a functional imper fec-
tion and a normative collision. Thus, art.91, sec-
tion 2 of the law concerning local public admi-
nistration stipulates that the functions of rayon
president and vice-president, as well as the
function of mayor and vice-mayor are incom-
patible with the function of councilor.
This is valid for the function of councilor at
any level, though there is no reason why a ma-
yor could not be a rayon councilor in the rayon
where he is mayor. At the same time the Law
concerning the statute of the locally elected
leader in art.7 part c) stipulates that: the local
elected leader mandate is incompatible with
the councilor position of a similar level council
or of a councilor of different level councils of
other territorial  administrative unities of second
level (of a rayon) than the commune or village
he was elected.
Another problem of the statute of locally
elected official is the mayor s dismissal. To un-
derstand the context it is important to know
mayors are also one of the categories of local-
ly elected officials. Art.2 of the Law stipulates
that:  In regard to the present law, the notion
of locally elected official refers to the village
councils (comunnes), cities (municipalities) and
rayon, deputies of the Popular Assembly of
Gªgªuzia and mayors. Similar to the parlia-
mentary mandate the local official mandate
does not have a juridical relation between the
voters and the elected, there is no subordinate
relation and no agreement of will. In this sense,
paragraph 1 art.4 of the statute of locally elec-
ted officials, as well as article 68, paragraph 2
from the Constitution, resolve for locally elec-
ted officials the following: Each imperative
mandate is null . In art.3 of the above mentio-
ned law is stated that in the exercising of the
mandate, the locally elected official is in servi-
ce of the community. The stipulations prove that
the mandate of the locally elected official is
representative and at the same time irrevoca-
ble, this represents a protection of the indepen-
dence of the local official in exercising his
mandate.
At the same time, art. 33-paragraph (2), part
a) from the Law concerning Local Public Admi-
nistration says that the mandate of the mayor
can not be exercised in case of revocation
through a local referendum. This stipulation
contradicts article 4 of the Law regarding the
statute of locally elected officials that reads that
Every imperative mandate is null , as well as a
series of articles from the Electoral Code that
foresee the revocation of the mayor.  Except
this, we draw your attention to the stipulations
of art.177, paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code,
which states the reasons of revocation of the
mayor are: (1) in case the mayor does not res-
pect the interests of the community; (2) in case
he does not fulfil l his duties; (3) violates the
moral and ethical norms.
Only a deeper analysis of these articles can
demonstrate how abnormal they are, because
there is no principle foreseen by the legislation
that can state what the interests of the local
community are. This makes it unclear in what
conditions it can be proved that: the mayor
does not fulfill his duties and who will judge if
a mayor fulfils his mandate correctly or not. The-
re are no normative documents that state com-
pletely what are:  the off icial ly recognized
moral and ethic norms. It is considered that in
these conditions art.178 paragraph 2 from the
Electoral Code is sufficient for the revocation
of the mayor. This article states: The mayor is
revoked from his function without any kind of
local referendum, due to the resolution of the
revocation of the juridical institution in case the
Constitution and the laws are not respected,
he participates in the activity of unconstitutio-
nal organs, or is in the state of incompatibility
foreseen by the law. This law is not hindered
by eventual ambiguous interpretations or con-
flicts of authority, which can further weaken the
system of local authorities from Republic of
Moldova.
The recent revision of the system of local
public administration introduced a new institu-
tion, called the rayon president. This institution
substituted the president of the executive com-
mittee of the judet. This time the legislative sup-
pressed the collective executive organ, which
was in old times called the executive county
committee, attributing these functions to a
uninominal organ, personalized the rayon pre-
sident . We do NOT have the idea that this new
institution would not be legitimate, or inadequa-
te if the law was more explicit in settling the ju-
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ridical nature of this authority, but since this is
absent from the law there are questions that
need answering. Already in art.1, at General
disposals we can discover proof that stipula-
tes that the president of the rayon is the exe-
cutive authority of the county council In the
rest of the law there is no mention of the juridi-
cal status of the institution. Article 59: states that
this exerts the prompt management of local
public problems in the limits of its competen-
ces; represents the county in relations with the
government, but also with other central public
authorities, with physical and juridical persons
from the country and from other foreign coun-
tries, as well as in court, is the coordinating per-
son of the deconcentrated public services from
the frame of the county and exerts the attribu-
tions of the commissions president for excep-
tional situations. We can notice that, the law
does not give any hints over the fact that the
county president fulfils the function of the exe-
cutive organ of the rayon council.
Art.60 from the law stipulates the main com-
petences of the rayon president. Strangely
enough nothing is mentioned about the obli-
gation of organizing the implementation of the
rayon councils decisions. This is stipulated only
in the domain of assuring the rule of law, where
at part a) it mentions the execution of the de-
cisions of the county council. Naturally a ques-
tion comes up here. Why is there no obligation
in the other the domains to implement the
councils decisions? From this we can conclu-
de that the author of the law did not clarify the
juridical nature of the institution analyzed abo-
ve, instead giving the president too many com-
petences in the individual exertion of his func-
tion of the executive organ of a representative
of public authority. The repeated reading of the
stipulations settled in art.61, makes us believe
things through which to the rayons president it
is assigned the right to emit disposals with a
normative and individual character . We think
that this article confirms one more time our pru-
dence connected with the president s institu-
tion of the rayon council. This is due to the fact
that it is nonsense that through private institu-
tions adopted by only one person to set up
administrative documents with normative na-
ture, which, in their turn, could lead to sanc-
tions in case they are not followed.
Another essential problem is that the law says
nothing about the institution responsible for
deconcentrated services in the rayon. In art.59,
titled  The role and status of the rayon presi-
dent, in section (3) we quote:  the role and sta-
tus of the rayon president is coordinator of the
deconcentrated public services of the rayon
framework. We should understand from these
words that actually, the president is  just a co-
ordinator , and not responsible for the admi-
nistration of deconcentrated public services,
concerning those public services which are ta-
ken from the central public administration,
being autonomously organized within the fra-
mework of the respective administrative units!
A logical question appears  - if these services
are taken from the central public administra-
tion subordination, under whose subordination
are they and who is responsible for their admi-
nistration. We understand that after changing
this system in terms of legislation adopted in
1998, the institution of prefect has disappea-
red, an institution that was responsible for the
deconcentrated public services. These services
remained in the territory with the same status,
but now the authors could not officially give the-
se tasks to the rayon president. This would mean
that he would become responsible, and subor-
dinated to the central administration. This would
cause serious damage to principle of local au-
tonomy and to the principle of deconcentrated
public services creating a relation of subordina-
tion and not collaboration as section 2) of art.6
of the Law stipulates.
Also interesting is that the executive bodies of
local public administration authorities have un-
der their supervision staff specialized in various
areas. They are set up within the framework of
the town hall or at the rayon level, ensuring, ac-
cording to their working rules, various types of
services supplied on behalf of the local council
and the town hall. In order to have an efficient
local council, this has a secretary responsible
for organizational activities. The council secre-
tary is also the commune or towns secretary. In
this respect, the new legislation has preserved
former rules regarding the secretary s status. But
here we will mention quite an important problem,
which was ignored both by the former legisla-
tion and by the present one. The law stipulates
that the secretary takes part at the local council
meetings, being responsible for elaborating mi-
nutes and for legal adoption of the resolutions
passed. The law requires that the secretary
should approve the resolution projects, regarding
their legality. We should understand out of the
content of this requirement that the local coun-
cil can not start the resolution project examina-
tion if it is not approved by the secretary. The
secretary can not refuse the adoption of the pro-
ject in any means. If the project is legal he will
make the respective inscription and will sign, and
in case when he considers the projects or some
of its requirements illegal, he is obliged to write
it in the notification.
In this respect a delicate problem appears, if
the council examines a decision, which is con-
sidered to be illegal by the secretary. Obviously,
having the duty to adopt the decision may not
admit the acceptance of documents, which
contradict the legislation in force. However, if the
document is passed and causes damage (finan-
cial) should we know who bears the responsibili-
ty for this? This article says that the secretary is
responsible for the documents legality, howe-
ver art.29 says that the councilors take in solida-
rity the responsibility of the council s work and
for the resolutions for which they have voted. We
notice a normative conflict, which was admit-
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ted by the legislator and is a bad service to the
stability of the local authorities.
Of course, the secretary can not be given the
power to ban the authorities from examining any
resolution, being obliged only to note the lega-
lity. But the secretary may be unskilled in this
area, may possess no juridical knowledge, and
he may just not notice the illegality and then,
how can he be responsible for the legality and
what kind of responsibility will he have to take,
disciplinary, administrative, civil or criminal? In
this case the law resolves nothing. The inner struc-
ture of the local council is simple and depends
on the local collectivity s size, the patrimony that
it administrates and the budget it possesses. In
this respect, the law concerning local public
administration, stipulates that the commune,
town, city executive committee consists of the
mayor, elected by the respective community by
open, universal, secret and freely expressed
vote. The villages (communes) and towns (cities)
have one mayor and one vice-mayor each,
Bªlþi, Bender, Comrat and Tiraspol cities have
one mayor and three vice-mayors each, Chi”i-
nªu city has a general mayor and 4 vice-may-
ors, elected according to the law. Towns of over
15.000 inhabitants, through the decision of the
respective council, may have 2 vice-mayors. The
vice-mayors of the villages (communes), towns
(cities) of fewer than 5.000 inhabitants exert their
power on the public basis. The local council, at
the mayor s proposal, on the basis of standard
personal records passed by the Government,
approves of the organization charts and perso-
nal records of the town hall staff. The mayor,
according to the stipulations in the law, appoints
and dismisses the town hall staff. The rayon coun-
cil also approves the organizational chart and
the members of its own staff and apparatus, ba-
sed on standard personal records, approved by
the Government. The personal record of the ra-
yon council apparatus is appointed and dismis-
sed by the rayon president.
The staff of the town halls and rayon council
apparatuses is divided in two categories, public
and technical staff. Public staff are those who
are under the provisions of the Law regarding
public services while the technical staff perform
technical services so the local authorities can
do their work, this category is governed by the
labor legislation of the republic. The standard
personal record confirmed by the Government
represents the maximum level of the technical
staff of the communes and towns. We will men-
tion, however, that these standard personal re-
cords which are approved by the Government
limit the initiative of the local councils, as the
central authority is imposing a structure on them.
We believe that this situation contradicts art.109
of the constitution and art.3 of the law regarding
local public administration. This article states that
the territorial units have financial autonomy and
have the right of initiative regarding all local
public affairs. Art.6 of the European Charter sta-
tes that the local councils should themselves be
able to define the size of the executive structu-
res. There are numerous areas where the local
authorities must be involved, but they do not
have a qualified staff. Today, for example, only
one person deals with trusteeship at the rayon
level, though the proportions of the problems lin-
ked to child protection at the rayon level is wi-
der and more complex. According to a gover-
nment s resolution the rayon cannot employ a
sufficient number of civil servants, and not even
set up the boards considered necessary. For
example the Child Protection Office, existing in
the former judets, was eliminated from the ray-
on structure, leading to problems in planning
social policy for the poor. The situation for the
local authorities is even more alarming. Unfortu-
nately there is no qualified staff in the town halls
responsible for statistics and delivering social
services performed to the population. There is
also no network of social services for the rural
population. Due to the fact that almost all local
authorities are political entities, many questions
appear linked the decision-making procedures
and the management of complex social pro-
blems.
The central administration also sets the salary
level for the technical and public civil servants
of the local authorities. Thus, the expenditures
of the administrative staff of the rayon counci-
lors, the offices and departments subordinated
to these councils and town halls apparatus are
calculated on the basis of the Government s
Resolution regarding the organizational charts
and standard staff record. Government Resolu-
tion no.139 of 9.02.1998 must be taken into ac-
count:  Regarding the payment of civil servants
and people who perform technical services
which ensure the functioning of local authori-
ties on the basis of a single staff network.  The
single tariff network is an inheritance from the
former regime where the state was established
tariffs for every service. Under todays circum-
stances, the state may establish single tariffs for
the employees paid from the state budget. Ho-
wever for the employees of local public admi-
nistration, we think that establishing the salary
level is a problem belonging to the respective
authorities, whose work is organized on the ba-
sis of local autonomy. This also means finan-
cial autonomy. The state interference in this
area may be considered as an attempt to de-
crease the level of local autonomy.
2.6. Administrative Control
and Legal Guarantees Against
the Abuse of Local Government:
In order to ensure that the activities of public
administration do not contradict the law on lo-
cal public administration a method of control
has been developed. One chapter is titled:
Administrative control of local authorities. This
chapter is divided into three parts: 1) adminis-
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trative control; 2) legal control;  3)suitability
control. The administrative control checks the
observance of the Constitution, international
treaties that Moldova has signed, the law on
local public administration and other normati-
ve acts both by the local public administration
and the rayon authorities. The administrative
control also contains controlling the suitability
and the legal control. Art. 69 of the Law states
that the suitability control admits just partly what
refers to the duties commissioned by the state
to the local public administration. The adminis-
trative control stipulated in the law is organized
according to the following principles:
• Exerting control only according to the pro-
cedures and in cases stipulated in the
law;
•Observing proportionality between the in-
ter ference of the controlling authorities
and the importance of the interests they
are protecting.
• Prohibiting local public administration aut-
horities limitation right to administrate
autonomously, in accordance with the
law, the businesses which belong to pri-
vate competence;
The territorial offices of the state control the
legality of the documents adopted by the lo-
cal public authorit ies. This is a mechanism
through which the state verifies the legality of
the use of local autonomy. The law on local
public administration stipulates in art.71 that the
territorial offices of the state control the legality
of documents adopted by the local public aut-
horities, such as:
• Councils resolutions at the local and
regional level;
• Normative acts of the mayor, rayon pre-
sident and the pretor;
• The documents concerning auctions
and the land ownership deeds;
• Documents of employment and dismis-
sal of staff of local public administra-
tion;
• Provisions which imply expenditures or
financial commitments of more than
30.000 lei at the local level and 300.000
lei at the regional level;
• Documents issued in exercising good
commission.
The suitability control, according to art.77 of
the Law, has the right to modify or revoke the
administrative document within 15 days of the
adoption, on the basis of suitability. If the local
public authority considers the decision of the
central authority faulty they have the right to
ask the judgment of the court. However, it is
necessary to mention that these ways of admi-
nistrative control are not in contradiction with
the European Charter or stipulations of the con-
stitution. There is a problem with who performs
the legality control. Under the former law, the
prefect had this right, as a representative of the
government in the territory, appointed through
a government resolution. The prefect held the
status of public authority, administrating at the
same time other deconcentrated services of
the state in the territory. Without the prefect the
solution found was to set up a state office in
the territorial units, this office performs the le-
gality and suitability control of documents ad-
opted by the local authorities.
The territorial office does not have public
authority because it is part of the inner structu-
re of the government without the right to inter-
fere in the public domain. Caution is needed
while studying the competences of the territo-
rial offices, because they seem to have more
power than the law stipulates. At the opening
of the territorial office in Edinet (in the north of
Moldova) Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev stated:
This office is meant to contribute to the ac-
complishment of the government program in
Moldova: rebirth of the economy, rebirth of the
country, as well as to the implementation of the
economic and social development strate-
gies27(13). There are bureaucratic barriers bet-
ween the local government and the central
government, which the territorial offices have
to eliminate. (!)
It remains a mystery through which mecha-
nism the territorial office can ensure the imple-
mentation, at a territorial level, of governmen-
tal economical strategies. We should probably
understand that these offices will become the
supporters of government policy towards the
local and regional authorities. This brings to
mind the stipulations of art.4 (4) of the European
Charter through which the competence given
to local authorities must be normal, complete
and exclusive. They can not be limited by ot-
her central or regional authorities, except for
cases stipulated by law. As the law does not
stipulate a subordinate relationship of the lo-
cal authorities to the projects of the central
government, the result is that the efforts of the
territorial offices are misinterpreted, and could
lead to illegal actions.
An important problem of local autonomy is
still the legal protection of the local autonomy,
or, in other words, the right of local government
to protect their own interests through legal met-
hods. The existing legislation creates a certain
degree of protection against abuse which, ho-
wever are not specified  it is not known against
what kind of illegal actions the legislative gua-
rantees will serve, and they are not efficiently
explored by the local authorities. In this respect,
we mention that the new law regarding local
public administration  as well as the old one 
does not contain a chapter or article to resolve
concrete means of protection of local autono-
my in accordance with art.11 of the European
Charter. This article purposefully stipulates that:
the local public authorities should have the
right to appeal to the judicial system in order
to ensure a free exercise of their competences
and respect of the principle of local autono-
my.
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Art.73 of the law concerning local public
administration states only that the local and
regional councils may request from the territo-
rial office verification of the legality of docu-
ments adopted by the executive authority . The
mayor, rayon president as well as the secretary
may also request a legal control of documents
adopted by their councils.
The stipulations only mention the existence
of mutual control between the council and the
local executive committee. Not, about setting
up a system of proper juridical guarantees
against any kind of illegal actions, abuses, ex-
ceeding of competences, eventually, even on
behalf of the territorial offices of the state offi-
ce.
It seems that these juridical guarantees still
remain theoretical abstractions, justice being
entirely taken from the effective guarantee pro-
cess of the rights and principles of local auto-
nomy and decentralization. This law also does
not give the possibility either to the council or
the mayor to go to court to dispute decisions
from the rayon authorities, the government or
the ministries in case these break the legal rights
of local government. Even in art.77 of the Law
the local public authorities have the right to in-
form the administrative solicitor of the court,
only if he considers that the suitability control
resolution harms his rights, without specifying in
detail deeds which would ensure immediate
examination, in due time and competitive of
the modifications.
The legislative framework does not clearly
settle the rights of local public authorities to
appeal directly to the jurisdictional bodies to
defend the interests and rights of the local com-
munities. According to art.2 of the administrati-
ve solicitor s law any legal or juridical entity that
is harmed, has the right to appeal to the solici-
tor s courts. Because the Law does not specify
what kind of legal entities can be plaintiffs, we
may draw the conclusion that in this case they
mean both legal entities of private law and tho-
se of public law.
Thus, the territorial units, being legal entities
of public law (art.4 of the Law regarding local
public administration), may participate in the
administrative solicitor s courts as plaintiffs. At
the same time, in art.5 of the administrative
solicitor s Law purposefully  among persons
with the legal right in the administrative solici-
tor  are mentioned the local public authori-
ties. They are in this category of subjects only
due to part.(f) of the same article, which stipu-
lates that the plaintiffs within the administrati-
ve solicitor s courts may also be other persons,
in accordance with the law in force. The fact
that the law of the administrative solicitors does
not settle, deliberately, the mayor s and the lo-
cal council right to attack the documents issu-
ed by the central administration bodies, con-
stitutes an essential drawback, which makes the
access more difficult of the local communities
to the juridical system justice and which, in fact,
proves wrong the claims of the authors of the
recent legislation to strengthen the local lega-
lity and autonomy.
More than that, through the administrative
solicitor s laws, the government resolutions are
relieved of legality control, they are controlled
only with the constitution. We think that this juri-
dical situation is intolerable, due to the fact that
experience illustrates abundantly that the most
frequent abuse comes through government
resolutions, inadequately controlled and without
satisfactory preliminary examinations. A final
example is government resolution number 1202
of November 8. 2001 Regarding measures to
settle the use of water pools. Through this re-
solution, abusively, some of the water pools
which were municipal property were given by
the central government to the Piscicola Asso-
ciation. All the trials by the municipalities in the
last 3 years failed, until the constitutional court
declared the resolution unconstitutional. This
case is not an exception, but it is an example
of the regular abuse of power by the central
authorities towards the local authorities, who are
weakly protected by legislation. The stipulations
in the text of the administrative solicitor s law,
through which the Government resolutions of a
normative nature are excepted from the lega-
lity control, unfortunately remain in force until
now. This makes the repetition possible of go-
vernment intervention in domains belonging to
local authorities, without local authorities being
able to do anything about it.
There is an effective instrument for local aut-
horities to defend themselves against abusive
documents issued by the Parliament, president
and government which are in contradiction to
the principles of local autonomy stipulated in
art 109 of the constitution. This instrument is
checking these documents with the constitu-
tion; however the legislation does not permit the
local authorities to appeal directly to the con-
stitutional court. Still, there is a possibility, though
very complicated. It is possible only via people
with the right to file a complaint, who local aut-
horities may appeal to. Through this person and
via an unconstitutional exception, the court
may accept this route in case of examining
concrete cases. These possibilities are difficult
and inefficient for the local public authorities,
being dependent on the willpower of other peo-
ple.
2.7. Exerting the right to freely
associate for local public authorities:
The developments in the last years prove that
the local authorities in the Republic of Moldo-
va are crushed by instability. If they cannot uni-
te local public administration will not be able
to reach the quality standards normal in West-
ern European Countries. A key problem is the
large number of associations. These associa-
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tions are divided amongst them and poorly
administrated. They do not contribute to the
creation of a single democratic voice that can
speak on the behalf of the local authorities. It is
obvious that before and after the elections of
May 2003, the associations in the Republic of
Moldova tried to work in order to create a sin-
gle association at the national level. This diffi-
cult objective spontaneously became the ob-
ject of discussions immediately after the results
of the local ballot had been announced, which
brought about some entirely unexpected re-
sults. The government took two types of actions
in reaction to this discussion. (1) The compulso-
ry creation  via the newly founded rayons  of
local and rayon branches and of one single
association, APCLM, parallel to the marginali-
zation of the other associations, (refusing to re-
cognize the branches of the other associations),
and (2) the elaboration of a draft law regarding
the work of associations of local authorities in
the Republic of Moldova (14) 28 . Both actions
have been vehemently disputed by civil socie-
ty. As a matter of fact this conflict between the
government and the associations of local aut-
horities was also discussed at the Conference
between 2 and 4  July, and at the Round Table
on November the 15 th, organized by the Politi-
cal Directorate of the CoE on RMs implemen-
tation of its duties concerning the CPLR Resolu-
tion of the 4 th of June, 2003. We will further ana-
lyze the goal and the stipulations of the draft
law, which aroused the most important ques-
tions.
The idea of a general legal regulation of the
associations of local authorities is effective and
useful. In this regard there is experience on the
international level. Such a normative act, ad-
opted according to the stipulations of the Eu-
ropean Charter on Local Autonomy, normally
should contribute to the strengthening of LPA
associations. This would help the associations
to become centers of promoting and defen-
ding the legal interests of local authorities, es-
pecially in relation to the central government,
while at the same time bringing into practice
the principles of local autonomy and building
a modern and effective local administration.
Such a law should not contradict the funda-
mental normative acts in force and the princi-
ples of a democratic and pluralistic society.
Caution is also necessary to prevent the law of
becoming a mechanism used for the narrow
interests of certain government or political cir-
cles. Whether it is to diminish the influence of
certain organizations or to deprive representa-
tives of LPA of the possibility to express their
opinion on issues of LPA both internally and ex-
ternally. In our opinion, regretfully, the law con-
tains stipulations, which make us doubt the con-
stitutional nature and the impartiality of the fu-
ture law, arousing our suspicions of the real in-
tentions of the law.
Especially worrying is the stipulation of the
4 th article through which a single organization
at the national level is being imposed on the
local authorities. This runs counter to democra-
tic standards settled by the Constitution (art.4
and 5), as well as by the stipulations art.10 of
the European Charter on Local Autonomy. Here
the right is mentioned of the local authorities
to cooperate and join with other authorities in
order to achieve goals of common interest.
Through the stipulations in art. 4 the local aut-
horities will be deprived of an alternative and
loose the right to choose and associate freely
with an organization which would suit their in-
terests. At the same time, we think that this sti-
pulation is against art.54 of the Constitution. It
stipulates that in the Republic of Moldova laws
cannot be adopted which suppress or diminish
citizens fundamental freedoms and rights. In
this respect, any limitation and restriction of the
right of the local authorities (including the right
of free association), should be interpreted as
an obstruction and limitation of the rights and
freedom of the citizen himself. Through univer-
sal, open and freely expressed vote these aut-
horities have been entrusted with the right to
act as representatives for the sake of and on
behalf of the local collectivities. At the same
time, as the practice of other countries (Roma-
nia, Bulgaria etc.) proves, the process of unifi-
cation of LPA organizations should rely on good
will, the agreement of the local authorities and
their right for free election, however not through
administrative documents (i.e. laws). If not, there
is an abusive interference of the state in the
associative process. The rights of local authori-
ties to found associations at the national level
are restricted
Moreover, we think that there is a contradic-
tion and fundamental incompatibility between
art.4 and art.8 of the law in question. On the
one, it is mentioned that the association is the
only organization at the national level (art.4),
but on the other hand it is mentioned that the
core objectives of this association are to achie-
ve the right of association right of local public
administration authorities and to promote de-
mocratic values in the development of local
autonomy (art.8 p. a-b). How are these objecti-
ves to be achieved if a single organization of
LPA is imposed by law, and there is no alterna-
tive for local public authorities? According to
us the phrase: it is the single association at the
national level should be excluded. Instead
we propose the following draft: The associa-
tion is a non governmental organization, non-
commercial and politically not affiliated, open
to all authorities of local public administration
on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.
The 13 th article of the draft contains a dan-
gerous and contradicting stipulation which as
a rule may either block the process of the cre-
ation of powerful and effective LPA organiza-
tions or lead to the creation of an organization
completely dependent on the government. The
first may happen because practically, due to
excessive politicization in the Republic of Mol-
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dova it will be very difficult to accumulate the
necessar y number of councils; at least the
majority of the councils in the country. The cre-
ation of a dependent organization may hap-
pen by the use of administrative resources to
gather 50% of councils. This seems to be incor-
rect from a strategic point of view. It is impor-
tant for Moldova to have an organization that
is able to promote the principle of local auto-
nomy and the interests of the local authorities.
We think that this stipulation may be interpre-
ted (with that of the art.4) as a limitation of the
rights of local authorities of free association.
Moreover, it is unreasonable that due to these
unfounded restrictions, for example, 30% of the
councils which represent up to 60-70% from the
countr y s population will be refused registration
only because they do not represent 50% of the
countr y s councils. On the basis of simple arit-
hmetic it seems as if this stipulation as well as
those mentioned in art.4, were introduced to
form an organization subordinated entirely to
the current government and to stop any possi-
bility of criticism or opposition from the local
authorities.  Keeping this stipulation may lead
to a considerable decrease of the role and ef-
fects of such an association, because it would
not be able to get rid of the label of being a
governmental organization, in spite of the sti-
pulations concerning the non-governmental
and apolitical nature.
At the same time, we think that if the law
would be adopted in this variant, the local col-
lectivities could associate successfully on the
basis of their right of association, in the frame-
work of non-formal associations (without a le-
gal entity), without the necessity of registration
at the Ministry of Justice or an other state body.
The existence of this type of associations, in the
absence of suitable national settlements, can
be based on the European Charter of Local
Autonomy regarding the right of association of
local authorities (art.10). Thus, the maintenan-
ce of these restrictions, in our opinion, instead
of creating adequate conditions for the con-
solidation of local authorities, will polarize and
radicalize the associations of LPA. Thus, regar-
ding what was mentioned concerning art.4, we
propose the revision of art.13 section 2 in order
to reduce or abolish the amount of councils
necessary for registering an association at the
national level (i.e.: 1/3, 1/5), which will increa-
se the credibility towards this future normative
act.
Another unresolved issue in the draft law, is
that for the registration as a juridical entity at
least half of the councils are needed. Thus,
according to art.11 of the project, the Congress
of representatives from the authorities of local
public administration who want to be member
of the association found the association. Ho-
wever it is not shown, how many councils can
meet in the Congress to declare the founda-
tion of the Association. However as a rule, the
first Congress takes place on the initiative of the
most active people and does not meet the
necessary number of members for registration,
reaching the necessar y quota happens only
after a certain period. Therefore, these stipula-
tions may be also interpreted that two local
councils may declare the foundation of an as-
sociation and during a certain period of time
(until reaching an amount stipulated by law,
which requires a certain period of time), may
work legally and without being registered as
legal entities at the Ministr y of Justice. In our
opinion, these stipulations may lead to diffe-
rent interpretations, which may generate con-
flicts, as well as bring confusion in the process
of creating associations. In this respect, in or-
der to avoid this confusion and interpretations
we propose, besides the proposal above, two
possible solutions. The first is to cancel all re-
strictions concerning the number of councils
necessary for registering an association. The
second is to specify what is the minimum num-
ber of councils necessary for the founding con-
gress of the association and the period of time
during which this number should reach the size
stipulated by law, in order to be registered.
Though art.6 of this draft resolves to ban in-
terference of the public authorities and their
civil servants in the associations activity, howe-
ver, taking into account the recent example of
the creation of associations in the Republic of
Moldova at the order of the central government
and the county administrations, it must be men-
tioned that such inter ferences may take place
not only in the process of association, but also
during the foundation. That is why, in order to
avoid all kinds of speculations in this respect
we suggest to add a stipulation to art.6 in order
to ban the inter ference of the central public
and counties authorities, including the following
functions (prime-minister, the county president
etc.) not only in the activity, but also in the foun-
dation process of the associations of local aut-
hority. Moreover, in this article the consequen-
ces must be stipulated (civil, administrative and
penal), for the interference in the foundation
and work of LPA associations.
Starting from the stipulations of art.5 of the
draft where the principles of transparency, le-
gality, democracy, freedom of association etc.
are mentioned, and art.9 of section 3, where it
is stipulated that the statute of the association
may not contain stipulations against the con-
stitution, we think that section 3 and 4 of art.10,
which refer to the method of adopting resolu-
tions and the deliberative nature of the Con-
gress, must be specified. Particularly, we pro-
pose to specify in section 3 what is meant with
half: half of the association members, half of
the representatives of all the local authorities
from Moldova or half of the local authorities who
represent not less than half of the Moldovan
counties etc. At the same time, on the basis of
the idea that this organization must work ba-
sed on mutual consent, we think that in section
4 of art.10 a series of cases must be stipulated
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when resolutions can be adopted by an abso-
lute majority vote (50+1), as well as by a quali-
fied majority (2/3 of the total number of asso-
ciation members). These kinds of stipulations,
should lead to the establishment of a construc-
tive dialogue and mutual consent in the frame-
work of the organizations work.
Another problem consists is the fact that in
the project nothing is said about the link of the
local budgets to the financial duties of the as-
sociation members (at least concerning fees).
We think it necessary for this issue to be stipula-
ted deliberately in future law, which will avoid
problems and different interpretations. As to the
patrimony of the association (art. 14) it must be
mentioned that stipulation of section 3 point c
of art 14 raises some doubts. Among other pa-
trimonial sources of the association are men-
tioned also state subsidies. We think that this
stipulation is opposed to the independent and
non-governmental nature of the association
and may create a possibility for future interfe-
rence and control exercise on the behalf of the
central government. We propose to exclude this
stipulation because the state can not spend
public budget sources for financing NGOs, ot-
herwise, this organization will become gover-
nmental, with all the consequences. In our opi-
nion art.11 section 2 should also be revised and
specified. This article refers to the quota of re-
presentation in the association for each coun-
cil. This stipulation which establishes a quota of
one representative for every 6 councilors, can
lead to a transformation of the association into
very large and ineffective body. That is why, we
propose a quota of representation of one per-
son to nine members of the Local Council and
also one person for the rest of the councilors,
in case these are more than five. Moreover, the
local authorities with more than 100 thousand
inhabitants have the right to choose one more
representative for every other 100 (50, 75 etc.)
thousand inhabitants. This will respect the inter-
est of some of the larger administrative units.
Concerning art.23, the government s inten-
tion to liquidate the existent critical associations
is obvious. However first of all we have to men-
tion that there is no association in Moldova
which is to be considered a national associa-
tion of LPA corresponding to the stipulations of
this draft. None of the existent associations are
based on the decision of the local council. Both
in deed and right, all these organizations of LPA
in Moldova represent associations (unions, fe-
derations, etc.) of the citizens  associations on
the basis of the communal professional inter-
ests and/or other nature (art.1 the Law concer-
ning the public associations). In Moldova there
are associations of categories of employees in
local public administration: mayors, councilors,
accountants etc. a simple proof in this respect
is the fact that all these organizations were cre-
ated according to the Law concerning public
associations. Their registration as associations
of LPA according to the mentioned law would
be considered illegal because there is a deli-
berate stipulation of this law (art.1 paragraph
3) through which the law stipulates that the law
of public associations is not applicable to as-
sociations of public authorities.
Therefore, if this law will be adopted, it will
be necessary to create a new LPA organization.
This will be able to happen after a tough and
unpredictable process of approval of the local
councils from the majority of the mayoralties
from Moldova. Thus, the stipulations of this draft
cannot be extended over the existing organi-
zations, for the simple reason that the law con-
cerning public associations settles the founda-
tion and the activities of these associations. This
law stipulates the right of any persons including
mayors, ex-mayors, and councilors of LPA etc.
to associate in professional nongovernmental
organizations. That is why, if there are going to
be attempts to liquidate these organizations,
these actions will be fought in the Constitutio-
nal Court and the European Court of Human
Rights. On the other hand these actions will ex-
pose the real intentions of the authors of the
draft law. Therefore, we propose to exclude the
stipulations of art.23 which refer to self-dissolu-
tion on the basis of the decision of the Ministry
of Justice. These stipulations are without a goal
(there are no such organizations in Moldova)
and the existent organizations work on the ba-
sis of the Law concerning public association.
To make it worse the stipulations of art. 23 are
anti-constitutional because it breaks the con-
stitutional right of citizens to freely associate.
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3.1. The implementation
of the recommendations proposed
by the CoE in 2003
The local autonomy in the Republic of Mol-
dova has regularly been monitored, especial-
ly in recent years. The accent in recent years
has been on the compability with the European
standards and practices, including the Euro-
pean Charter for Local Autonomy and the re-
commendations of the Congress of Local and
Regional authorities of the Council of Europe.
The resolutions adopted are not just formal re-
commendations for the central authorities to
fulfil l the requests of the CoE, but are also an
important tool to show the dedication of the
Republic of Moldova to join the European Uni-
on. There appears to be a public consensus
of the need of monitoring local autonomy. But
this consensus might quickly disappear if the
government does not implement the recom-
mendations it says to support.
In this context there is a plan of actions agre-
ed upon at the congress organized on the 8 th
and 9 th of July 2003 in Chisinau with the title:
Actua l  s i tuat ion and fu tu re tendencies  .
Through implementing this plan of actions it
would no longer be necessary to monitor Mol-
dovas local autonomy. A problem in the con-
tinual changes made to the legislation is that
there is no strategy to change local public ad-
ministration to reach European standards. The
plan of actions proposed by the European ex-
perts contained the following goals:
- Analyzing the current system of local
public administration, and identifying
obstacles in the process of decentra-
lization in the Republic of Moldova;
- Formulating an action plan for
removing the identified obstacles;
- Identifying the roles and responsibili-
ties of every actor in the process of
decentralization.
Immediately after the action plan was pre-
sented the CoE stated the responsibility of the
government to finalize the plan and to start the
implementation. On October 22-23 there was
another round table on the previously adop-
ted recommendations organized by the Direc-
torate General of the CoE, department of co-
operation of local and regional authorities. The
goal of the round table was to monitor the pro-
gress made on the implementation of the re-
commendations made by the CoE. It is impor-
tant to mention that one of the demands of
the CoE is that besides the government offi-
cials also independent local experts, represen-
tatives of local authorit ies and academics
should take part in the discussions concerning:
Consolidating local democracy in Moldova.
As during the summer the round table discus-
sed subjects related to:
- Revising the legislation according to
the stipulations of the European
Charter;
- Starting an institutional dialogue
between the central authorities and
the local authorities as well as a
dialogue between the central autho-
rities and the associations of the
local authorities;
- Consolidation of the statute of locally
elected officials;
- Establishing a solid and clear inter
budgetary relationship between the
various level of government;
- Ensuring an effective monitoring of
the actions of local public adminis-
tration.
It would have been normal for the gover-
nment to at least take heed of the lesson of
listening to civil society after the grave irregu-
larity with the European standards, in defining
its priorities of reforming and modernizing lo-
cal public administration. It also would have
been normal to at least publish the plan of ac-
tions which should have been published for
2004. Already at the end of October certain
officials promised the creation of a transpa-
rent consulting institution for defining a strate-
gy with the priorities for reforming local public
administration. The main mission of this institu-
tion would be to start elaborating and plan-
ning the plan of actions recommended by the
CoE, and to analyze the functioning of local
public administration identifying problems and
solutions in this domain. Unfortunately this in-
stitution has not been created yet, and the
government of Moldova, which carr ies the
responsibi l i ty for implementing the plan of
actions has not said a word about the plan of
actions since the meeting with the CoE.
III. Strategic planning for local
government reform
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To make the situation worse the central aut-
horities have adopted new legislation in the
domain of local public administration without
consulting local authorities or experts on this
new legislation. This make the repetition of the
previous mistakes possible namely: legal con-
tradictions and problems which have proven
to be difficult to resolve. A perfect example of
this is the adoption of the law on 10.10.03 on
local public finance. Due to the fact that this
law has been implemented recently (01.01.04)
we have not included this law in our analysis,
however we will mention one problem. The pro-
blem comes from the stipulations in art. 4: De-
limitation of competences in public expendi-
tures. This article stipulates for each level (lo-
cal, regional) the domains in which they can
make public expenditures. Paragraph two of
this article stipulates for the local council bud-
get expenditures for implementing measures
in the domain of mil i tar y-administration. In
paragraph four however the following domains
are established for the rayon council: suppor-
ting secondary schools, boarding schools, ly-
ceums, ensuring public order and military-ad-
ministrative activities.
These competencies according to the sti-
pulations of art. 12 and 13 of the law on local
public administration are delegated compe-
tencies.  The financial resources for these com-
petencies should not come from the local bud-
gets, but from financial sources allotted from
the central authorities. However until now the
government has not transferred funds to the
local budget for these delegated competen-
cies, which makes it hard to monitor these ex-
penditures. Even worse it makes intervention
and control by the state imminent on these ty-
pes of expenditures, which is against the sti-
pulations of the European Charter. A confusing
situation has also been created relating to the
regulations of the statute of locally elected of-
ficials. The law on the statute of locally elec-
ted officials has not been changed, however
there have been several declarations that this
laws will be changed soon.
The institutional dialogue has remained only
an idea. In reality there is no clear concept
on how this dialogue could be regulated. This
dialogue never really started, but stayed poli-
tically colored, and with a centralist bureau-
cratic model. Through this the central power
dictated goals and gave indications. There has
been no discussion or consultation with the
local authorities. The government has not in-
cluded NGOs working in this domain in the dia-
logue. Quite on the contrary, certain actions
by the government in this area even lead to
legal and constitutional contradictions
3.2. Final Recommendations
A careful analysis of the current situation in
the field of local public administration reveals
factors that negatively impact the implemen-
tation of an effective system of local public
administration. Obviously, the most important
constraint is related to the problematic eco-
nomic situation in the Republic of Moldova,
generating a chronic financial deficit in the
local budgets and, as a consequence, limi-
ted possibil it ies to efficiently manage local
public administration. However, the economic
situation of the countr y cannot be a justifica-
tion for several drawbacks existing in the legal
and practical functioning of the public admi-
nistration. The principles of local autonomy are
considerably limited mostly to the autonomy
of decis ions which is  explained other wise
through a permanent mentorship (toutele)
from the central and rayon authorities. First of
all, this concerns mostly the rules and proce-
dures of the local public finances. Currently,
the methodology of the financial-budgetary
planning does not have appropriate leverages
to influence local autonomy, nourishing a ge-
neral trend of diminishing the fiscal basis of
local revenues and large expectations from
state transfers. As a result, the share of the lo-
cal revenues is rather limited, while local aut-
horities remain dependent on the policies and
limitation of the Ministr y of Finance. A rather
complicated situation is also experienced with
the municipal ownership and the framework of
property relations of the territorial-administra-
tive units, concerning mainly the effective and
real capacity of the local authorities to use fre-
ely their own property and real estate.
The current legislation does not specify what
are: state, rayon or municipal goods. Their le-
gal statute is often weakened by several legal
inconsistencies and voluntary actions of the
state administration. This is reflected specifi-
cally in a large number of conflicts that were
met in the last years with various categories of
properties: lakes and forests, estates and unfi-
nished constructions belonging to several pu-
blic institutions located on the territory of the
current local authorit ies, including schools,
health care centers and education. There is a
list of urgent matters that should be urgently
tackled in our opinion, including the following:
- there is no strict division of compe-
tencies between local and central
public authorities, in other words,
there is a lack of a specific tool to
apply the principles of decentraliza-
tion and deconcentraion of the
public services;
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- there is no division of responsibilities
between local - communal - rayon
and central authorities regarding the
results of the administration;
- local authorities do not have the full
capacity to accomplish their consti-
tutional rights regarding local autono-
my, because they lack financial
resources and properties - public and
private - at the level of municipalities,
communes and towns;
- there are no specific regulations
stipulating concrete forms of protec-
ting local autonomy. Moreover, no
legal act regulates the procedural
relationships concerning the right of
the local authorities to directly apply
to the juridical system when their
rights are affected/infringed by the
central bodies;
- local authorities have no direct
access to the constitutional court in
order to apply for constitutional
control of the normative acts and
national laws that infringe upon the
constitutional provisions setting up
the limits of local autonomy;
- ownership rights and legal guarante-
es stil l exist mainly on paper because
of a largely imperfect and incomple-
te legislation, which has been adop-
ted with several inconsistencies,
which does not explicitly regulate the
property relations of the local authori-
ties with other legal entities.
The analysis of the current legislation in Mol-
dova reveals that the countr y stil l lacks a uni-
tary legal framework that would improve most
of the aspects regarding the ownership of the
terr itorial-administrative units (entit ies, legal
statute, ways and rules of transfer from the
public into private ownership, privatization, etc)
in accordance with the spirit and letter of the
European Charter, Civil Code and the legisla-
tion on local public administration.
The return of the rayons to the territorial fra-
mework of the countr y did not coincide with
an active normalization of these relations. The
administration has approached the citizens but
not public services. Thus, in order to demon-
strate that the latest reform has reduced the
local bureaucracy, the Government has deci-
ded to limit existing municipalities with more
than half of their local personnel. A specific
decision adopted by the Government which
has a very severe impact on the current op-
portunities of the municipalities to hire and dis-
miss their personnel has a large prohibitive
force on the current decision-making autono-
my of the local authorities. This is however not
applied with the same force on rayon admi-
nistrations, which has significantly increased
their staff and functions, contrary to the pre-
vious recommendations of the CPLRE. There-
fore, there is a certain propensity to apply the
principles of staffing and salar y rates on the
basis of unified salary system inherited from the
previous regime, moreover, in order to justify
the numerical decline of the municipality per-
sonnel as a result of the latest reform, the Go-
vernment intervened actively with a sharp re-
duction of the local communes and towns. Of
course, as a result, the quality of public servi-
ces dropped, while citizens became aliena-
ted from the local decision-makers.
The reform of the local public administra-
tion is feeding important public debates. Ho-
wever, the state administration is continuously
neglecting the role of public consultations and
reform-planning of its policies and programs.
As a result, the state administration cannot
share its commitment to reform the system of
public administration with prominent civil so-
ciety organizations, associations of mayors,
and other professional bodies. It seems that
the process of planning reform is stil l concei-
ved according to the old-fashioned techniqu-
es that do not leave any space for public con-
sultation and policy process. We think that the
countr y would need a large assistance in the
planning of the public administration reform,
aiming to:
- adjust the professional capacity for
planning and decision making,
increase the knowledge of the
decision-making and legislative
process in accordance with the rules
and norms existing in several Euro-
pean states;
- provide better and more reliable
information on the objectives and
principles of the planned legislative
and normative changes, improving
communication with the public,
involving the professional and re-
search community, business circles
and associations of local gover-
nments in order to upgrade the
quality the projects with the aim to
magnify the solidarity of various
social groups with the political targets
of reform;
- improve the quality of preparatory
activities of the drafts of the law
concerning their material and techni-
cal-legislative content, setting up
clear responsibilities for the professio-
nal evaluations and ad hoc evalua-
tion of the draft laws, conditions
required for their adoption and latter
implementation;
- orient the preparation of the new
drafts of the law, more structured and
comprehensive, towards the older
practices of changing legislation and
producing amendments, which shall
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be vastly coordinated with the rest of
the legislative acts;
- increasing the horizontal and vertical
coordination of the planning reforms
within the Governmental agencies,
improving the process of preparing
legal notifications on behalf of
ministries and other central bodies,
which would require a radical trans-
formation of the process of planning
reforms by curbing unrealistic expec-
tations and efforts mostly focused on
short-term results, based on a signifi-
cant increase of professional require-
ments from the public servants of the
Government and sub national autho-
rities;
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